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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

—

Appellate Court No.
930071-CA

UNION PARK ASSOCIATES, a Utah
Limited Partnership,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Priority Number 15
v.
GUMP & AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.
00O00

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
1.

Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals

to hear this appeal by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (k) (1953 as
amended).
2.

This appeal is from multiple Orders of the Third Judicial

District Court as follows:
(a)
Judgment,

Granting
on

Plaintiff's

Plaintiff's

first

Complaint,

Motion
on

for

the

Summary

issue

of

Defendant's liability;
(b)

Denying Defendant's Motion for Leave to Amend;

(c)

Granting

Plaintiff's

second

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment on the issues of damages, late fees, interest and
Plaintiff's entitlement to attorney's fees; and
1

(d)

Denying

Defendants

Cross-Motion

for

Summary

Judgment on the issue of the propriety of the contract
interest rate.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the Memorandum and supporting Affidavits filed by

Defendant/Appellant in opposition to Plaintiff's first Motion for
Summary Judgment raise a genuine issue as to a material fact to
defeat

Plaintiff's

right

to

Judgment

for

liability

against

Defendant for the balance due and owing on a Promissory Note?
Plaintiff's Summary Judgment was granted by the lower Court as a
matter of law and is therefore subject to review for correctness by
this Court.

Barber vs. Farmers Ins. Exch., 751 P.2d 248 (Ut. Ct.

App. 1988).
2.

Did the District Court commit an abuse of its broad

discretion by denying the Defendant's Motion for Leave to Amend,
which

Motion

was

totally

unsupported

by

either Affidavits,

evidentiary materials or a Memorandum, and which Motion the Court
determined to be moot as a result of the Court's granting of
Plaintiff's first Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of
liability?

The District Court has broad discretion in matters

regarding amendments to pleadings, which decisions are subject to
review only for abuse of discretion.

Goeltz vs. Continental Bank

& Trust Co., 299 P.2d 832 (Utah 1956).
2

3.
for

Did the District Court err in granting Plaintifffs Motion

Summary

Defendant's

Judgment

on

Cross-Motion

the

issue

of

damages

for Summary Judgment

by

and

denying

calculating

interest under the Promissory Note on a Mper annum" interest rate
as required by Utah statute?

Plaintiff's Motion for Summary

Judgment on the issue of damages was granted as a matter of law and
is therefore subject to review for correctness by this Court.
Barber vs. Farms Ins. Exch.. 751 P.2d 248 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon.
The
motion shall be served at least 10 days before
the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse
party prior to the day of hearing may serve
opposing affidavits.
The judgment sought
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law.
A summary judgment,
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on
the issue of liability alone although there is
a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration;
(1)

Filing and service of motions and memoranda.
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda.
All
motions, except uncontested or ex-parte
matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum
of
points
and
authorities
appropriate
affidavits, and copies of or citations by page
number to relevant portions of depositions,
3

exhibits or other documents relied upon in
support of the motion. Memoranda supporting
or opposing a motion shall not exceed ten
pages in length exclusive of the "statement of
material facts11 as provided in paragraph (2),
except as waived by order of the court on exparte application. If an ex parte application
is made to file an over-length memorandum, the
application shall state the length of the
principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is
in excess of ten pages, the application shall
include a summary of the memorandum, not to
exceed five pages.
Motions for summary judgment.
(a) Memorandum in support of motion.
The
points and authorities in support of a motion
for summary judgment shall begin with a
section that contains a concise statement of
material facts as to which movant contends no
genuine issue exists.
The facts shall be
stated in separate numbered sentences and
shall specifically refer to those portions of
the record upon which the movant relies.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion.
The points and authorities in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment shall begin with a
section that contains a concise statement of
material facts as to which the party contends
a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact
shall be stated in separate numbered sentences
and shall specifically refer to those portions
of the record upon which the opposing party
relies, and if applicable, shall state the
numbered sentence or sentences of the movantfs
facts that are disputed. All material facts
set forth in the movant1s statement and
properly supported by an accurate reference to
the record shall be deemed admitted for the
purpose
of
summary
judgment
unless
specifically controverted by the opposing
partyfs statement.

4

Utah Code Ann, § 15-1-3 (1953 as amended):
Whenever in any statute or deed, or written or
verbal contract, or in any public or private
instrument whatever, any certain rate of
interest is mentioned and no period of time is
stated, interest shall be calculated at the
rate mentioned by the year.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 16, 1990 the Appellee/Plaintiff, Union Park
Associates (hereinafter "Union Park"), commenced the present action
against Appellant/Defendant, Gump

& Ayers Real

(hereinafter "Gump & Ayers") (R. 2) .

Estate, Inc.

Pursuant to its Complaint,

Union Park sought recovery for the balance due and owing on a
Promissory Note executed by Gump & Ayers (R. 2 and 3) . On December
13, 1990, Gump & Ayers filed an Answer admitting execution and nonpayment but denying liability (R. 14). Union Park answered Gump &
Ayers' discovery requests on January 14, 1991 (R. 19), and filed
its first Motion for Summary Judgment on February 22, 1991 (R. 50).
That Motion was supported by a Memorandum of Points and Authority
as well as an Affidavit filed contemporaneously therewith (R. 21
and 53).

Union Park further filed an Affidavit in support of its

request for attorneyfs fees (R. 21). Gump & Ayers received one
extension of time within which to respond to the Motion for Summary
Judgment, by stipulation of the parties (R. 187). Thereafter, Gump
& Ayers filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary
Judgment on March 21, 1991 (R. 213). Gump & Ayers1 response was
5

supported by two Affidavits (R. 189 and 207).

Simultaneously with

filing its Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment, Gump &
Ayers filed a Motion for Leave to Amend its Answer to raise the
defense of fraud in the inducement, as well as a counter-claim
similarly predicated upon fraud (R. 235). Gump & Ayers1 Motion for
Leave

to

Memorandum.

Amend

was

unsupported

by

either

Affidavits

or

a

Union Park filed a Memorandum in Response to the

Motion for Leave to Amend

(R. 263) and a Reply Memorandum in

support of its Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 317). Union Park's
Reply Memorandum was supported by supplemental affidavits (R. 289
and 335).
All pending Motions, including Union Parkfs Motion for Summary
Judgment and Gump & Ayers1 Motion for Leave to Amend were scheduled
for hearing before the Court on November 4, 1991 (R. 431). Hearing
on the aforementioned Motions was continued and ultimately held by
the Court on January 10, 1992 (R. 436) .

At the hearing, Union

Park's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted on the issue of
liability. Issues of damages and attorney's fees were reserved for
further proceedings (R. 471). Gump & Ayers' Motion for Leave to
Amend was denied (R. 471).

Due to objections to Union Park's

proposed Order, the Order of the Court was not entered until August
25, 1992 (R. 449, 456, 470).
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Union Park filed a second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
on the remaining issues of damages and attorney's fees on August
28, 1992 (R. 474).

The Second Motion for Summary Judgment was

supported by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities (R. 474) and an
Affidavit of Amount Due and Owing (R. 502). Gump & Ayers obtained,
by Motion, a second extension of time (R. 536), and finally filed
a Memorandum and Affidavit in Response to the Motion for Summary
Judgment on September 30, 1992 (R. 549 and 553). Gump & Ayers also
filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of the
interpretation to be given to the interest rate set forth in the
Note (R. 566).

On October 8, 1992, Union Park filed a Reply

Memorandum in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment and in
response to the Gump & Ayers1 Cross-Motion (R. 574).
The Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment were heard by the Court
on November 30, 1992 (R. 743).

Union Park's Motion for Summary

Judgment on the issues of damages and attorneyfs fees was granted
while the Gump

& Ayers1

Motion

for Summary

Judgment

on the

appropriate interest rate was denied (R. 606). The present appeal
ensued (R. 595).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
FACTS RELEVANT TO PLAINTIFF'S FIRST
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Appellant has not separately numbered its Statement of Facts,
which cannot therefore be specifically identified for purposes of
7

objection; and numerous "factual" statements are essentially legal
conclusions, as Appellant presumes ultimate findings, such as
fraud. Consequently, Appellee objects to Appellant1s Statements of
Fact in total, and hereby states the relevant facts to the issues
on appeal.
1«

Union Park is the owner of a commercial office building

located at 5925 Union Park Center, Midvale, Utah, which premises
shall hereinafter be referred to as the "Subject Premises11 (R. 31) .
2.

On June 1, 1983, Union Park as landlord and Gump & Ayers

as tenant entered into and executed a Lease Agreement (Lease Number
290), pertaining to office space on the second floor of the Subject
Premises (R. 31 and 66).
3.

Pursuant to Lease Number 290, Gump & Ayers leased 4,497

square feet of office space for a period of ten years beginning
March 1, 1984 (R. 31 and 216).
4.

On June 28, 1985, Union Park as landlord and Gump & Ayers

as tenant entered into and executed a second Lease Agreement (Lease
Number 260) pursuant to which Gump & Ayers acquired additional
adjoining office space in the subject premises (R. 31 and 32).
5.

Pursuant to the terms of Lease Number 260, Gump & Ayers

leased the additional space for eight years and eight months
beginning August 26, 1985 (R. 84 and 102).
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6.

Defendant Gump & Ayers continued to pay rentals pursuant

to the aforementioned Agreements through the month of April, 1988
and ceased to make lease payments thereafter and vacated the
premises in May, 1988 (R. 32).
7.

At the time Gump & Ayers ceased to make its monthly

rental payments, the monthly rental obligation was the sum of
$7,733.37 (R. 292).
8.

On December 7, 1988, Union Park and Gump & Ayers entered

into a Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release of Claims to resolve
the unliquidated continuing liability of Gump & Ayers to Union Park
under the two (2) outstanding leases for commercial space.

The

Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release operated as a release of
Gump & Ayers1 liability to Union Park on the outstanding leases in
exchange for payment of consideration consisting of an initial
payment of $10,000.00, a second payment of $10,000.00 due December
15, 1988 and execution of a Promissory Note providing for payment
of the principal sum of $55,000.00.

A copy of the Settlement

Agreement and Mutual Release of Claims is attached hereto as
Addendum Exhibit

f,

A".

A copy of the Promissory Note is attached

hereto as Addendum Exhibit

lf lf

B .

These documents were before the

Court in numerous pleadings (R. 3, 15, 104 and 108).
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9.

Gump & Ayers made payments under the Note through July

16, 1990 (R. 291) .

Gump & Ayers has refused to make further

payment under the Note (R. 3 and 15).
10.

There is a principal balance due and owing on the Note in

the sum of $35,352.46 as of July 16, 1990 (R. 291).
11.

At the time the Settlement Agreement was prepared in

November, there was past-due and owing pursuant to the Lease
Agreements the sum of $54,133.59 for rentals for the months of May
through November, 1988 (R. 292, 195 and 217).

On the date of

execution, Decemberfs rent also had accrued in the sum of $7,733.37
for total rent due in the sum of $61,866.96.
12.

Thus, the sum of $13,133.04 was to be paid to resolve

Gump & Ayers1 potential liability for future unaccrued rentals
(settlement

amount

of

$75,000.00

minus

accrued

rentals

of

$61,866.96 equals $13,133.04).
13.

As of the date of the execution of the Settlement

Agreement, Gump & Ayers had potential liability to Union Park for
unaccrued rentals in the sum of $487,202.31 calculated as follows:
a.

December

1988

through

February

1994

(date

of

termination of earliest lease, Number 290 (R. 216) equals
^sixty-three (63) months).
b.

Monthly lease obligations of $7,733.37 (R. 292).

C.

$7,733.37 x 63 = $487,202.31.
10

d.

This figure does not take into account potential

increases for shared tenant expenses due under the lease and
escalation clauses (R. 67).
14.

While negotiating with Gump

& Ayers to settle its

potential liability, Union Park was also negotiating with third
parties in order to mitigate damages to Union Park as a result of
the breach (R. 35 and 59).
15.

On November 23, 1988, Union Park entered into a Lease

with Matrix Funding Corporation covering a portion of the space
formerly occupied by Gump & Ayers. Matrix did not take possession,
nor begin paying rents until January, 1989 (R. 35, 60 and 136).
16.

However, in the process, Matrix Funding Corporation

vacated other space in the Subject Premises, which space remained
vacant for one year (R. 35 and 60).
17.

In order to secure rental of the portion of the space

formerly occupied by Gump & Ayers by Matrix Funding, Union Park renegotiated its lease with Matrix Funding and received a lower rent
per square foot (R. 35 and 60) .
18.

In connection with the partial reletting of the Gump &

Ayers space to Matrix Funding, Union Park incurred costs in the sum
of $18,559.00 in leasehold improvements (R. 36 and 60).

11

19.

By a Lease Agreement dated April 30, 1988, Union Park was

able to lease the balance of the former Gump & Ayers space to
Miles, Inc. (R. 36 and 61).
20.

Presuming that the two substitute tenants identified

herein remain in possession of the subject premises and pay all
rentals on time, Gump & Ayers1 minimum potential liability for
future rents, as of the date it entered into the Settlement
Agreement,

was

in the

sum

of

$71,531.82

(rental

shortfalls

$52,972.82 plus tenant improvements $18,559.00 equals $71,531.82).1

1RENT EXPECTATIONS (R. 61 and 62)
1968
Gump & Ayers
$7,159.92 * $573.45 =
Nos. 260 and 290

$ 7,733.37 per month

Matrix
$6,666.45 • 2,366.27 =
Nos. 250 and 260

$ 9,032.72 per month
$16,766.09

LOSS MITIGATION
1989

5 months

6 months

1 month

Matrix
No. 250

$12,967.04

$13,291.25

$14,653.96

Miles, Inc.
No. 290

1.362.71
$14,329.75

1.362.71
$14,653.96

1.593.92
$16,247.88

Difference

$ 2,436.34

$ 2,112.13

$

LOSS EXPECTATION THROUGH MAY 31. 1994
($2,436.34 x 5 months) =
( 2,112.13 x 6 months) =
J
518.21 x 54 months) =
Rental Differential Subtotal:

$12,316.70
12,672.78
27.983.34
$52,972.82

IMPROVEMENTS =

$18,559.00

TOTAL:

$71,531.82

12

518.21

21.

Gump & Ayers opened settlement negotiations prior to

October 4, 1988 (R. 314).
22.

No portion of the Subject Premises was leased to a

substitute tenant prior to November 23, 1988, on which date a
portion of the Subject Premises was relet to Matrix Funding. Even
that portion of the Subject Premises remained vacant until January
1, 1989 (R. 135).
FACTS RELEVANT TO GUMP t AYERS* MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM
23.

Simultaneously with filing its Answer, Gump & Ayers

propounded discovery requests to Union Park (R. 14 and 18).
24.

Union Park responded to the outstanding discovery on

January 10, 1991 (R. 19) , and waited over one month, until February
22, 1991, prior to filing its Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 19
and 28)•
25.

Gump & Ayers responded to the Motion for Summary Judgment

on March 21, 1991 (R. 213) and on March 22, 1991 filed a Motion for
Leave to file an Amended Answer as well as a Counterclaim, both of
which sought relief based upon allegations of fraud (R. 235).
26.

Gump & Ayers1 Motion for Leave to Amend was completely

unsupported.

It is composed of two sentences, neither of which

argues any legal basis demonstrating that Gump & Ayers was entitled
to the relief requested (R. 235).
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27.

Argument on Union Park's Motion for Summary Judgment and

on Gump & Ayers1 Motion for Leave to Amend was heard by the Court
on January 10, 1992 (Appendix Exhibit "C" at Page 1).
28.

The Court stated, at the opening of argument, that it was

not necessary to hold specific and separate arguments on the two
Motions, as the subject matter of the two was intertwined (Addendum
Exhibit M C" at Pages 2 and 3).
29.

Mr. McDonald, counsel for Gump & Ayers, agreed that the

various Motions pending before the Court were all related and that
argument relevant to the Motion for Summary Judgment

,f

is going to

really resolve everything" (Addendum Exhibit M C" Page 4).
30.

The Court gave full consideration to Gump & Ayers'

arguments of fraud (R. 437), and only after hearing all of Gump &
Ayers' arguments relevant to the issue of fraud, and determining
that any misrepresentation, if made, was not shown to be material
(R. 437), granted Union Park's Motion for Summary Judgment and
denied Gump & Ayers' Motion for Leave to Amend to raise fraud both
as an affirmative defense and as a counterclaim as said Motion was
then moot (R. 442) .
31.

In response to Mr. McDonald's comment to the Court that

he felt denial of his Motion for Leave to Amend had kept the issue
of

fraud

from

coming

before the Court

(R. 443), the Court

specifically responded that the Motion was before the Court, it was
14

a pending Motion, that the Defendant had argued the issue of fraud
and that the Court had duly considered Defendant's fraud claims (R.
443) .
32.

On August 25, 1992, the Court entered an Order granting

Union Park's Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of liability,
reserving for further proceedings issues of damages. By that same
Order, Gump & Ayers1 Motion for Leave to Amend was denied (R. 470,
471) .
FACTS RELEVANT TO UNION PARK'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ON DAMAGES AND GUMP AND AYERS' CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT PERTAINING TO PROPRIETY OF INTEREST RATE
33.

Union Park filed its second Motion for Summary Judgment

on the issue of damages on August 28, 1992 (R. 474).
34.

The Motion for Summary Judgment was supported by a

Memorandum of Points and Authorities (R. 477) and an Affidavit of
Amount Due and Owing (R. 502).
35.

Union Park's second Motion for Summary Judgment was

granted by Order dated December 16, 1992.

Union Park obtained

Judgment for the principal balance owing on the Note, as well as
attorneyfs fees, costs of Court and interest at the rate of 10% per
annum (R. 606-608) . Gump & Ayers now appeals only the propriety of
the Court's use of a 10% "per annum11
Appellant's Brief).
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interest rate.

(See.

36.

The portion of the Promissory Note which describes the

interest rate reads as follows: "This Note shall bear interest at
the rate of ten percent (10%) from and after May 1, 1988" (R. 507) .
37.

Gump & Ayers1 Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment filed on

October 1, 1992 pertains solely to the same issue of determining
the time period pursuant to which the 10% interest rate is to be
calculated (R. 568).
38.

The Court Order dated December 16, 1992 also denied Gump

& Ayers1 Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 606, 607 and 608).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
INTRODUCTION
The present action arose out of Gump & Ayers1 breach of its
Lease Agreements with Union Park. It has never been disputed that
Gump & Ayers leased premises from Union Park pursuant to two Lease
Agreements dated June 1, 1983 and June 28, 1985 (R. 54).

It is

undisputed that the leases were to run through early 1994 (R. 55) .
Gump & Ayers admits that it breached the Lease Agreements by
abandoning the premises in May, 1988 at a time when it had
approximately five (5) years remaining liability under the Leases
(R. 190). Gump & Ayers admits that it remained liable for ongoing
Lease; payments, despite the fact that it had vacated the premises
(R. 190).
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After

substantial

negotiations,

the

parties

executed

a

Settlement Agreement in December, 1988, which Agreement was to
resolve the accrued liabilities of Gump & Ayers for the eight (8)
months which had elapsed since its abandonment of the premises, as
well as an additional sum in settlement of liability for future
lease payments that might accrue with respect to the abandoned
premises (R. 192). The Settlement Agreement included a Promissory
Note in the sum of $55,000.00, which Note is the subject matter of
Union Park's present action.
Union

Park

brought

the present

action

to

enforce that

Promissory Note. Gump & Ayers1 sole defense to liability is based
on alleged misrepresentations regarding re-leasing of the premises,
which induced them to enter into the Settlement Agreement and
Promissory Note. Gump & Ayers alleges it would not have agreed to
pay any sums in excess of rentals already accrued, had it not been
for the allegedly fraudulent representations.

Thus, the issue

before the District Court, which is the same issue to be reviewed
by this Court, was whether Gump & Ayers produced

sufficient

evidence of material fraudulent representations to preclude the
enforcement of the Settlement Agreement and Promissory Note. The
District Court properly concluded that the evidence produced by
Gump & Ayers was insufficient as a matter of law.
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Union Park's

Motion for Summary Judgment was granted on the issue of liability
and the Defendant's Motion for leave to Amend was denied.
Union Park's second Motion for Summary Judgment was filed on
the issue of damages.

Union Park prevailed on all points,

including the principal balance due and owing on the Note, right to
attorney's fees and costs, as well as interest. Gump & Ayers filed
a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on the issue of the appropriate
interest rate to be employed.

The Note provides that interest be

calculated at the rate of 10% but does not state the time period
over which interest is to be calculated.

The Court properly

employed a per annum interest rate in reliance on Utah statutes.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PROPER WHEN THERE IS NO GENUINE ISSUE
AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT
The standard for entry of Summary Judgment as set forth under
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, reads as follows:
The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
(Emphasis added).
Utah case law makes it clear that Rule 56 requires two (2)
separate inquiries.

There must be a genuine issue of fact to be
18

resolved by the trier of fact. Further, the disputed fact must be
material to the outcome of the action.

"The foregoing rule does

not preclude summary judgment simply whenever some fact remains in
dispute, but only when a material fact is genuinely controverted".
(Emphasis added).

Healar Ranch, Inc. vs. Stillman, 619 P.2d 1390,

1391 (Utah 1980).
It

is undisputed

that Gump

obligations to Union Park.

& Ayers breached

its Lease

It is also undisputed that past-due

rentals in the amount of $61,855.96 were due at the time that Gump
& Ayers agreed to settle its past and future obligations for
$75,000.00, payable $20,000.00 initially with the balance over time
pursuant to the subject Note.

It is undisputed that Gump & Ayers

signed the Settlement Agreement and Note and made payments for a
while. Consequently, Gump & Ayers1 only defense to being obligated
under the Note is its allegation of fraudulent inducement. Gump &
Ayers has only cited one representation that it alleges was false
which supports its claim.
Gump & Ayers alleges, through the Affidavit of Jerry Floor,
that during late November and early December, 1988 (the Settlement
Agreement was executed December 7, 1988), an officer of Union Park
represented to him that the leased premises remained vacant at that
time

(R.

192).

Union

Park

submitted

significant

evidence

contradicting the Defendants allegation that this allegedly false
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representation was made.

(See, Affidavit of Thomas Lloyd# R. 289-

314).
Union Park disputed this allegation and produced to the Court
a copy of the Lease Agreement with the first substitute tenant
(Matrix Funding), which tenant took over a portion of the space
vacated by Gump & Ayers.

That Lease Agreement establishes that

this entity did not take possession of the premises and begin
paying rent until January, 1989 (R. 135). Therefore, the premises
were vacant at the time Gump & Ayers alleges the representations
were made.

Union Park also produced for the Court copies of the

time records of the attorney who represented Gump & Ayers in the
negotiations.

Those time records establish that negotiations

actually occurred prior to execution of the Matrix Lease (R. 335) .
It is Union Park's position that any representations which were
made regarding the status of the premises during the negotiation
phase were made at a time when the premises were not only vacant,
but not subject to a new lease.

Consequently, even the existence

of a disputed fact is questionable.
It is apparent that the District Court disbelieved Gump &
Ayers and felt that no misrepresentation had been made.

"I am not

convinced that there were misrepresentations, but there is some
evidence to the contrary11 (R. 437) .

However, the District Court

indulged Gump & Ayers on this point stating:
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w

And so on that

point, Plaintiff would not be entitled to Summary Judgment alone"
(R. 437).

Therefore, the District Court properly resolved the

disputed fact of the misrepresentation in favor of Gump & Ayers.
However, the District Court went on to grant Summary Judgment
on

the

issue

of

liability,

stating

that

even

if

such

a

representation had been made, it was not material to the Settlement
Agreement and Promissory Note. The Court stated:
...[I]t seems to me that that, under all of
the
facts,
including
the
contractual
obligations which the defendants submit they
did owe at that time, both having already
accrued and what they were exposed to, and in
light of the damages amounts that the
plaintiffs did suffer as a result of the
termination of the lease, and cost associated
with re-letting, and all of that, when you
look at all of the numbers that are involved,
I just don't see this as material.
...For
that reason then, I am not inclined to accord
that view and would rather on the issue of
liability grant summary judgment in favor of
the plaintiff.
(R. 438) .

Thus, the issue is whether, giving Gump & Ayers the

benefit of the presumption that the allegedly false statements were
made, whether they had any material bearing on the execution of the
Settlement Agreement and Promissory Note.

It is clear that they

did not.
A.

The District Court properly applied the "clear and
convincing evidence" standard.

Gump & Ayers raised the affirmative defense of fraud in the
inducement to the enforcement of the Promissory Note.
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Fraud is a

wrong of such a nature that its existence must be shown by clear
and convincing evidence.
(Utah 1980).

Tavlor vs. Gasor, Inc., 607 P.2d 293

When opposing a motion for summary judgment on an

integrated contract, and with all disputes resolved in its favor,
the party alleging fraud must demonstrate the elements of fraud in
a clear and convincing manner.

Laird vs. Laird, 597 P.2d 463, 466

(Wyo. 1979), and Applied Genetics vs. First Affiliated Securities,
912 F.2d 1238, 1243 (10th Cir. 1990). Further, the Promissory Note
which Union Park attempts to enforce is part of a Settlement
Agreement.

Settlement agreements will only be set aside for the

strongest of reasons, which also must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence. Lomas & Nettleton Co. vs. Tiger Enterprises,
585 P.2d 949 (Idaho 1978). After reviewing the evidence and giving
full consideration to Gump & Ayers1 evidence of fraud (R. 437) and
resolving the factual disputes in favor of Gump & Ayers, as the
non-moving

party,

the

District

Court

properly

applied

these

standards and granted Summary Judgment in favor of Union Park on
the issue of liability. Even after resolving all disputes in Gump
& Ayers1 favor the Court felt that: "...Defendant has not shown by
clear and convincing evidence that the misrepresentations were
material...,f (R. 437). This Court should also apply the "clear and
convincing standard" in reviewing the Order granting Union Parkfs
Motion for Summary Judgment.
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The leading case on this point is Anderson vs. Liberty Lobby.
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed. 2d 202 (1986). In the
Anderson case, the United States Supreme Court was reviewing a
grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendant.

The case

dealt with a libel case in which the plaintiff carried the burden
of proving that the allegedly libelous material was published with
malice.

The United States Supreme Court in Anderson determined

that a court, when reviewing a motion for summary judgment, should
consider the substantive evidentiary burden that the non-moving
party has to carry in the event of a trial on the merits.
252.

Id. at

The Supreme Court noted that they should apply the clear and

convincing standard which applies to libel cases. Id. at 244. The
Supreme Court in Anderson acknowledged that there was a time when
the test at the summary judgment stage was the "scintilla of
evidence" standard.
Formerly, it was held that if there was what
is called a scintilla of evidence in support
of a case, the judge was bound to leave it to
the jury, but recent decisions of high
authority have established a more reasonable
rule, that in every case, before the evidence
is left to the jury, there is a preliminary
question for the judge, not whether there is
literally no evidence, but whether there is
any upon which a jury could properly proceed
to find a verdict for the party producing it,
upon whom the onus of proof is imposed.
(Boldface in the original, additional emphasis
added)•
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Id. at 251.

The Supreme Court expressly rejected the "scintilla"

rule and adopted the position that, even at the summary judgment
stage, the substantive evidentiary burden should be considered.
Thus, in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, the judge must view the evidence
presented through the prism of the substantive
evidentiary burden.
This conclusion is
mandated by the nature of this determination.
The question here is whether a jury could
reasonably find either that the plaintiff
proved his case by the quality and quantity of
evidence required by the governing law or that
he did not. (Emphasis added)•
Id. at 254.
Further, the Supreme Court in Anderson, acknowledged that a
judge is still not to weigh evidence, but to give the non-moving
party the benefit of every dispute and presumption.
[I]t is clear enough from our recent cases
that at the summary judgment case the judge's
function is not himself to weigh the evidence
and determine the truth of the matter, but to
determine whether there is a genuine issue for
trial.
Id. at 249.

However, if having given the non-moving party the

benefit of every presumption and inference, no reasonable finder of
fact could find in favor of the non-moving party, summary judgment
is proper.
The inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry
of determining whether there is the need for a
trial - whether, in other words, there are any
genuine factual issues that properly can be
resolved only by a finder of fact, because
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they may reasonably be resolved in favor of
either party. (Emphasis added).
Id. at 250.
Finally, while the Anderson case was a libel case, the United
States Supreme Court specifically provided that the substantive
burden of evidence is relevant to any civil case. It specifically
stated:
This view is equally applicable to a civil
case to which the "clear and convincing"
standard applies.
...Thus, in ruling on a
motion for summary judgment, the judge must
view the evidence presented through the
substantive evidentiary burden.
(Emphasis
added).
Id. at 254.
The "substantive burden" test as set forth in Anderson has
been adopted by many jurisdictions and in many factual scenarios.
This test was adopted by the Nevada Supreme Court in the case of
Bulbman, Inc. vs. Nevada Bell, 825 P.2d 588 (Nev. 1992), in which
a fraud claim was dismissed at the summary judgment stage.

The

Nevada Supreme Court noted that the pleadings and proof should be
construed in a light most favorable to the moving party.
591.

Id. at

After acknowledging that the Summary Judgment standard has

not changed in that regard, the Court went on, in reliance on the
Anderson case, to rule that summary judgment is still proper if
viewing the fact in a light favoring the non-moving party the
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evidence is such that no reasonable finder of fact could return a
verdict for the non-moving party.

Id.

The same result was reached by the Washington Appellate Court
in Adams vs. Allen, 783 P.2d 635 (Wash. App. 1989). The Adams case
was again a summary judgment case involving a claim of fraud.

In

Adams the court noted that the party pleading fraud must produce
evidence on all of the elements of fraud to fulfill its burden of
proof. The Court then dismissed the claim of fraud in reliance on
the Anderson substantive burden test.

Id. at 640.

The Arizona Supreme Court has also adopted the "substantive
burden test" in a series of cases which has applied the test to all
civil cases.

This series of cases begins with Dombey vs. Phoenix

Newspapers. Inc., 724 P.2d 562 (Ariz. 1986).

In Dombey, the

Arizona Supreme Court applied the "substantive burden" test in the
context of a libel case.
In sum we conclude that the determination of
whether a given factual dispute requires
submission to a jury must be guided by the
substantive evidentiary standards that apply
to the case.
This is true at both the
directed verdict and summary judgment stages.
Consequently, where the New York Times "clear
and convincing" evidence requirement applies,
the trial judgefs summary judgment inquiry as
to whether a genuine issue exists will be
whether the evidence presented is such that a
jury applying that evidentiary standard could
reasonably find for either the plaintiff or
the defendant.
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Id. at 572.

The Arizona Supreme Court subsequently applied the

rule to ordinary tort cases.

In the case of Orme School vs.

Reeves, 802 P.2d 1000 (Ariz. 1990), the court was faced with a
motion for summary judgment pertaining to an indemnity claim.

In

Orme, a student contracted salmonella from meals served to him at
school.

The disease was contracted during a time period during

which the student consumed 122 different meals at the school.
However, only one was prepared by the school. The other 121 meals
were prepared by an outside food service.

The school filed a

motion for summary judgment and prevailed. The court in Orme noted
that in this tort case the standard of evidence was merely one of
"preponderance".

Moreover, and in reliance of the Anderson case,

the court determined that the chance that the school prepared the
"culpable" meal, which was a less than 1 in 100 chance, would not
provide a fact finder with a reasonable basis upon which to find
the school liable.
On such evidence, no reasonable juror could
conclude by even a preponderance of the
evidence that Orme, rather than CWS, was
actively responsible for the injury through
meals.
Id. at 1010.
This series of cases was most recently reaffirmed in Thompson
vs. Better-Bilt Aluminum Prod., 832 P.2d 203 (Ariz. 1982), wherein
the Arizona Supreme Court again reiterated that the non-moving
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party is to receive all reasonable inferences, but thereafter the
court can still grant summary judgment if appropriate.
...[T]he motion should be granted if no
reasonable jury could find the requisite evil
mind by clear and convincing evidence.
Id. at 211.
The "substantive burden" test has also been adopted by the
Wyoming Supreme Court in Albrecht vs. Zwaanshoek Holding, 762 P.2d
1174 (Wyo. 1988) in a summary judgment case involving a claim of
fraud.

The court noted that it is not the judgefs function to

weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to
determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial and in that
process the Anderson test is to be employed.
The correct approach is articulated in
Anderson vs. Liberty Lobby [citation omitted].
The standard to be applied for that purpose is
whether a reasonable jury could find the
evidence sufficient to meet the clear and
convincing standard...
Id. at 1182.
Consequently, in light of the authority of Anderson, and the
subsequent cases which have adopted the "substantive burden" test
in similar circumstances, the proper standard to review Gump &
Ayers1 defense of fraud is whether there was sufficient evidence,
after all inferences and disputes resolved in its favor, to find
that it had met its burden of showing by clear and convincing
evidence that a fraud had occurred.
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This requires an inquiry into

all

elements

of

fraud, including materiality

and

reasonable

reliance. As will be shown in Subpart B below, the District Court,
after resolving all factual disputes in favor of Gump & Ayers,
properly concluded that Gump & Ayers had not shown by clear and
convincing

evidence

that

the

alleged

misrepresentation

was

material. Therefore, the District Court correctly granted Summary
Judgment in favor of Union Park.

Further, the ruling can also be

supported on the basis that there was no showing by Gump & Ayers of
reasonable reliance, or Union Park's intention to induce reliance,
or Gump & Ayers1 consequent damage. This Court should approve this
standard, and rule that it was properly applied in affirming the
Order granting Summary Judgment in Union Park's favor.
B.

The District Court properly determined that Gump & Ayers1
allegations did not raise an issue of material fact.
In order to review the ruling that Gump & Ayers did not show

by clear and convincing evidence the "materiality" of the allegedly
fraudulent statements, it is necessary to review the factual
context and what the District Court referred to as "all of the
numbers that are involved".

When one examines Gump & Ayers1

potential liability under the Lease Agreements, both its minimum
and its maximum potential liability, it cannot be reasonably found
that the alleged misrepresentation had a material effect on
inducing execution of the Settlement Agreement.
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Gump & Ayers abandoned the leased premises in May, 1988 (R.
190).

It signed the Settlement Agreement and Promissory Note on

December 7, 1988 (R. 192). Gump & Ayers admits that the Settlement
Agreement and Promissory Note were intended to resolve not only its
accrued liability as of that date, but also its potential future
liability

(R. 194, 195).

As of the date of the Settlement

Agreement, the accrued liability of Gump & Ayers for the eight (8)
months which had elapsed since it abandoned the premises, was the
sum of $61,866.96 (R. 292). This is predicated on a calculation of
Gump & Ayers1 monthly lease obligation of $7,733.37 over the eight
(8) months which had elapsed.

This left the sum of $13,133.04 as

a payment in settlement of potential future liability2.

Thus, the

sum of $13,133.04 was to be paid to settle Gump & Ayers1 potential
future liability.

In defense, Gump & Ayers stated that it would

not have agreed to pay any sum in excess of accrued rentals had it
known that a portion of the premises it had abandoned was subject
to a lease agreement with a substitute tenant

2

(R. 192).

In

Gump & Ayers contends that the monthly lease obligation was
$7,516.26, which would have resulted in a payment of $60,130.08 for
accrued obligations, while leaving $14,869.92 to be paid in
settlement of potential future obligations (R. 195). Union Park
believes its calculation to be more accurate. Union Park submitted
to the District Court, through the Supplemental Affidavit of Thomas
Lloyd, documentation of the actual amounts paid by Gump & Ayers
pursuant to its Lease Agreement, which documentation supports Union
Park's calculation. Gump & Ayers never, thereafter attempted to
contradict Union Park's use of the $7,733.37 per month figure.
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response to this allegation Union Park provided the Court with
evidence of the total amount for which Gump & Ayers would be liable
to Union

Park, pursuant

to the Leases, were the Settlement

Agreement never entered into.

These numbers, which were not

substantively disputed by Gump & Ayers, conclusively establish, as
a

matter

of

law,

the

immateriality

of

the

alleged

misrepresentations•
As pointed-out above, Gump & Ayers agreed to pay the sum of
$13,133.04, in excess of its accrued liabilities, in settlement of
its potential future liabilities under the Lease.

As of the date

of the execution of the Settlement Agreement and Promissory Note,
Gump

& Ayers1

$487,775.76.

potential

future liability was in the sum of

(See, Statement of Facts at Paragraph 15).

This

figure represents the Lease obligations, as of the date of the
Settlement Agreement, multiplied by the number of months remaining
on the Lease.

This amount does not include increases in tenant

shared expenses and escalator clauses, which were unliquidated at
the time of the settlement agreement.

This potential future

liability obviously dwarfs the amount paid by Gump & Ayers to
settle its future liability. However, even more telling is Gump &
Ayers1 minimum potential liability under the Lease Agreement.
As set forth in the Statement of Facts, Union Park had managed
to partially mitigate its damages by entering into a substitute
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lease agreement, pursuant to which a portion of the space formerly
leased to Gump & Ayers would be occupied by a substitute tenant.
This is the lease which Gump & Ayers claims was not revealed to it,
and

upon which

it bases

its affirmative

defense

of

fraud.

Approximately six (6) months after execution of the Settlement
Agreement and Promissory Note, Union Park was able to further
mitigate its damages by reletting the remainder of the premises.
This fact, having not occurred at the time the Settlement Agreement
was executed, could not have possibly been within the contemplation
of the parties.

However, for purposes of argument, Union Park

presented to the Court a calculation of damages which it suffered
and will suffer, even with the entirety of the leased premises
relet to new tenants.

The calculation presented to the District

Court also presumed that the substitute tenants would remain and
pay all lease payments in a timely manner.

Of course, this is

giving Gump & Ayers the benefit of every possible inference.

In

the absence of the Settlement Agreement, if any of these tenants
were to abandon the premises prior to termination of Gump & Ayers
original Lease Agreements, or fail to meet their Lease obligations,
Gump & Ayers would have remained liable through early 1995. Giving
Gump~& Ayers the benefit of all these inferences and presumptions,
Gump & Ayers would still be liable to Union Park for future rentals
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in the sum of $71,531.82 if the Settlement Agreement and Promissory
Note were set aside.

(See. Statement of Facts at Paragraph 22).

In summary, Gump & Ayers agreed to pay the sum of $13,133.04
to settle future unliquidated lease liabilities, which would range
between a minimum of $71,531.82 and a maximum of $487,775.76.

In

light of these numbers, Gump & Ayers1 allegation that Union Park
failed to inform it, at the time of the negotiations, that it had
entered into a lease agreement which would, in the future, place a
tenant in a portion of the premises, is completely immaterial. In
fact, Gump & Ayers1 liability would only increase if the Settlement
Agreement were set aside.
A settlement agreement is a contract like any other which must
be supported by consideration.

It is clear that consideration can

consist of the resolution of a dispute when there are unliquidated
damages, even though the amount in dispute has not been precisely
determined or one party may be mistaken as to the amount of the
potential obligation settled thereby. International Motor Rebldcr.
Co. vs. United Motor Exch.. 393 P.2d 992 (Kan. 1964).

Further,

settlement agreements are greatly favored by the law and should not
easily be set aside. Lomas & Nettleton Co. vs. Tiger Enterprises,
585 P.2d 949 (Idaho 1978).

Therefore, to set aside the Settlement

Agreement and Note, there would need to be finding that the alleged
misrepresentation, if true, had a material effect which effected
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the very essence of the agreement. Gump & Ayers has not shown any
evidence of materiality.

The District Court correctly concluded,

as should this Court, that even assuming the existence of a
misrepresentation concerning the status of the premises, that
statement has not been shown to have a material effect on the
settlement of an unliquidated liability and therefore Summary
Judgment is proper in favor of Union Park.
C. The ruling of the District Court should be upheld if it
can be upheld on any proper theory.
It is well established law that this Court should uphold the
decision of the District Court if it can do so on any proper
ground.

Matter of Estate of Shepley, 645 P.2d 605 (Utah 1982).

The Utah Supreme Court has gone so far as to say that this rule
should be enforced even in cases where the lower court assigned a
specific but incorrect reason for its ruling.
In any event, we are inclined to affirm a
trial court's decision whenever we can do so
on proper grounds, even though the trial court
may have assigned an incorrect reason for its
ruling.
Jesperson vs. Jesperson, 610 P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980).
In the present case, the trial court could have granted Union
Park's Motion for Summary Judgment, not only for Gump & Ayers1
failure to produce clear and convincing evidence of a material
misrepresentation, but also as a result of its total failure to
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produce clear and convincing evidence on the other essential
elements of fraud.
There are nine (9) elements to be shown in support of an
allegation of fraud.

The elements of a fraudulent representation

are:
(1) That a representation was made; (2)
concerning a presently existing material fact;
(2) which was false; (4) which the representor
either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made
recklessly, knowing that he has insufficient
knowledge
upon
which
to
base
such
representation;
(5) for the purpose of
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6)
that the other party, acting reasonably and in
ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely
upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act;
(9) to his injury and damage.
Pace vs. Parrish. 247 P.2d 273, 274 (Utah 1952) as quoted in Wright
vs. West Side Nursery. 787 P.2d 508 (Utah App. 1990).
Further, it is clearly the law that a party alleging fraud,
even at the summary judgment stage, must produce evidence on each
of the nine elements.
(Ariz. 1977).

Pace vs. Sagebrush Sales Co., 560 P.2d 789

It is also clear that failure to support the

elements of fraud with specific evidence is grounds for dismissing
a claim of fraud on summary judgment.

See. Norton vs. Blackham,

669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983).
Even assuming that misrepresentations were made as alleged,
Gump & Ayers has not provided any evidence to support the other
elements of fraud.

Examination of the Affidavit of Jerry Floor

filed in opposition to Union Park's Motion for Summary Judgment
shows that Gump & Ayers has made no allegation that Gump & Ayers
reasonably relied on the alleged representations, or that Union
Park intended Gump & Ayers to rely thereon, or that Gump & Ayers
has been damaged by its reasonable reliance. The Affidavits filed
by Gump & Ayers which comprise the whole record of this matter,
make no attempt to carry Gump & Ayers' substantive burden on these
issues.
Failure to allege a proper factual basis for reasonable
reliance resulted in dismissal of the plaintiff's case in a summary
judgment context in Sprunk vs. First Bank Western M. Missoula, 741
P.2d 766 (Montana 1987).

In Sprunk the plaintiff alleged through

an affidavit that the defendant had made certain misrepresentations
which induced execution of settlement arrangements on a prior debt.
However, the plaintiff failed to set forth the specific false
representations made.

Id. at 769.

The court also noted that the

plaintiff failed to allege a factual basis which would support the
element of reasonable reliance.
motion

for summary

complaint dismissed.

Based upon the foregoing, the

judgment was granted

and

the plaintiff's

In support of its ruling, the court repeated

the Well established rule of law that fraud can never be presumed
and the party carrying the burden of proof must produce evidence on
each of the nine elements of fraud.
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Id. at 769.

It is undisputed that the entities involved in this action are
both sophisticated corporations.

In support of its Motion for

Summary Judgment, Union Park also submitted to the District Court
the time sheets of the attorney representing Gump & Ayers, proving
that Gump & Ayers was fully represented by counsel during the
negotiation phase of the Settlement Agreement (R. 338-345).

In

addition, in the Settlement Agreement, Gump & Ayers acknowledged
the advice of counsel (R. 106) . It is also clear that the parties
to the Settlement Agreement were in an adverse position, each
wanting to resolve the dispute between the parties on the most
favorable basis possible.
The only evidence placed before the District Court by Gump &
Ayers, and relevant to the issue of reasonable reliance, is the
bare conclusion set forth in the Affidavit of Jerry Floor, which
reads:

,f

In negotiating the Settlement Agreement and Promissory

Note, Gump & Ayers relied on the statement by Thomas Lloyd..." R.
192) .
It is well established law in Utah that a party resisting a
Motion

for Summary Judgment cannot rely on statements in an

affidavit, which statements constitute unsupported conclusions of
law.

Specific facts in support of those conclusions must be set

forth.

Winter vs. Northwest Pipeline Corp.. 820 P.2d 916 (Utah

1991).

Conclusory allegations of fraud were determined to be
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insufficient by the Utah Supreme Court in Norton vs. Blackham. 669
P.2d 857 (Utah 1983).

In the Norton case, the plaintiff was

attempting to set aside a voluntary release in order to pursue a
tort action.

The Norton case was dismissed on summary judgment,

which dismissal was upheld by the Utah Supreme Court because the
plaintifffs affidavit filed in opposition to the motion for summary
judgment was conclusory, not alleging the specific underlying
facts.
likewise

Id. at 859.
purely

Gump & Ayers1 statement of reliance is

conclusory.

Nothing

was

submitted

for

consideration which stated in what ways or manner Gump & Ayers
reasonably relied.
Further, Gump & Ayers has made absolutely no allegation that
its reliance was reasonable.

The undisputed facts establish that

Gump & Ayers1 counsel participated in the negotiation and drafting
of the Settlement Agreement and Gump & Ayers could have protected
itself against the present eventuality through that Agreement by
setting forth the factors upon which it was relying.

Gump & Ayers

has made no allegation that any set of circumstances precluded it
from taking any of these steps.
In fact, the Settlement Agreement which was executed by Gump
& Ayers and in which its counsel was involved in drafting, clearly
and unambiguously states as follows:
7. Union Park and Gump & Ayers acknowledge
that this compromise and release has been
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entered into freely and with the advice of
counsel and that no representations of fact or
opinion have been made bv any party or bv
anyone acting in their behalf to induce this
compromise with respect to the nature of their
claims and damages.
(Emphasis added).
(Addendum Exhibit "A").
By entering into a Settlement and Release Agreement with this
language, Gump & Ayers specifically represented to Union Park that
nothing that was said by Union Park had any effect upon their
willingness to enter into the Settlement Agreement and execute the
Promissory Note. Gump & Ayers specifically disclaimed its right to
argue reliance and therefore should be estopped from raising the
issue of reasonable reliance in attempting to avoid its obligations
under the Settlement and Release Agreement. It is obvious that the
District Court could have found that Gump & Ayers did not raise
sufficient

evidence

of

reasonable

reliance

in

light

of

its

contractual representation that it did not rely on any statements
made on behalf of Union Park. Therefore, Summary Judgment in favor
of Union Park could be upheld on this basis alone.
Finally, Gump & Ayers did not allege that it relied to its
detriment and suffered damages as a result thereof. The undisputed
facts establish that if the Settlement Agreement had not been
entered into, Gump & Ayers1 liability would have been larger, not
smaller than agreed to. All of the evidence regarding Union Park's
efforts to mitigate damages was before the District Court in Union
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Park's

original

Judgment.

Memorandum

and

Affidavit

Supporting

Summary

None of that evidence was rebutted or challenged with

contrary evidence by Gump

& Ayers.

Union Park's undisputed

evidence established that, at a bare minimum, Gump & Ayers would
owe Union Park in excess of $70,000.00 in future rents, were not
for the Settlement Agreement.

Thus, Gump & Ayers has completely

failed to produce any evidence showing that it has been damaged.
The rule was well stated by the United States Supreme Court in
Celotex Corp. vs. Catrett. 106 S.Ct. 2548, 477 U.S. 321, 91 L.Ed.
2d 265 (1986) that a party must produce evidence on every essential
element of its case.
...Rule 56 (c) mandates the entry of summary
judgment... against a party who fails to make
a showing
sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that
party's case, and on which that party will
bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a
situation, there can be "no genuine issue as
to any material fact," since a complete
failure of proof concerning an essential
element of the non-moving party's case
necessarily
renders
all
other
facts
immaterial.
Id. at 2552.
Thus, Gump & Ayers1 total failure to produce any evidence
regarding reasonable reliance, knowledge by Union Park that there
would be reliance, or damages resulting from the reliance, is
itself an appropriate basis on which to uphold the ruling of the
District Court, as Gump & Ayers also failed to meet its substantive

burden on these issues. Therefore, there has not been an adequate
showing of fraud.
POINT II
GUMP & AYERS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND ITS ANSWER
TO ALLEGE BOTH AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE AND A COUNTER CLAIM
BASED UPON FRAUD WAS PROPERLY DENIED
Gump & Ayers' Motion for Leave to Amend its Answer and to
Assert a Counterclaim was properly denied.

There are at least

three (3) bases for upholding the District Court1s ruling. First,
Gump & Ayers1 Motion was unsupported and would have worked a
substantial prejudice on Union Park.

Second, Gump & Ayers1

recently claimed argument that it was in a Rule 11, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, paradox, is unsupportable. Third, contrary to the
statements in Appellantfs brief, the District Court gave full
consideration to Gump & Ayers1 allegations of fraud which were the
substance of its Motion to Amend.
A. Gump 6 Ayers1 Motion for Leave to Amend was unsupported
and therefore properly denied by the District Court.
On March 22, 1991# Gump & Ayers filed its Motion for Leave to
File an Amended Answer and Counterclaim (R. 235). The Motion for
Leave

to

Amend

memorandum.

was

unsupported

by

either

affidavits

or

a

The Motion itself cites no legal authority or basis

for the relief requested.

The Motion reads, in its entirety, as

follows:
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Defendant moves the Court for its order
granting leave to amend its Answer in this
action and to file a Counterclaim. Copies of
the proposed Amended Answer and Counterclaim
are attached hereto.
Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, governing
motion practice in district courts requires a memorandum in support
of all motions.
All motions, except uncontested or ex parte
matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum
of
points
and
authorities,
appropriate
affidavits, and copies of or citations by page
number to relevant portions of depositions,
exhibits or other documents relied upon in
support of the motion.
On May 7, 1991, Union Park filed a Memorandum in opposition to
the Motion for Leave to Amend, which Memorandum complies with the
requirements of Rule 4-501.

It included a statement of facts

supported by documentary evidence and references to the record in
support of each fact alleged.

It then set forth the standard of

review for motions for leave to amend and legal argument that Gump
& Ayers1 Motion for Leave to Amend should be denied.
Pursuant to Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a party
may amend its answer "only by leave of court or by written consent
of the adverse party... when justice so requires11.

Further, the

standard to be considered when determining whether justice requires
leave for amendment is undue prejudice.

Bekins Bar V Ranch vs.

Huth, 664 P.2d 455 (Utah 1983). These authorities were brought to
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the

attention

memorandum.

of

the

Court

through

Union

Park's

responsive

Union Park further brought to the attention of the

Court the prejudice it would suffer as a result of the requested
amendment.
Union Park commenced this action by filing a Complaint on
November 16, 1990 (R. 2). The Defendant was served on November 23,
1990 (R. 13) .

The Defendant filed an Answer and simultaneously

filed its First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production
of Documents on December 13, 1990 (R. 14 and 18).

Union Park

responded to the discovery on January 14, 1991 (R. 19), and then
waited five (5) weeks before filing its Motion for Summary Judgment
(R. 50). Even after Union Park's Motion for Summary Judgment had
been filed with the Court, the Defendant delayed an additional
thirty (30) days prior to filing its Motion for Leave to Amend (R.
50, 52 and 235). Union Park had prepared the Motion for Summary
Judgment and the supporting documentation relevant thereto in
reliance on the issues as framed by the pleadings on file at that
time (R. 269) . Union Park showed the Court the prejudice it would
suffer if the belated Motion for Leave to Amend were granted.
Even after Union Park responded to the unsupported Motion for
Leave

to Amend,

Gump

& Ayers did

not

avail

opportunity provided by Rule 4-501

(1)

(c) to file a Reply

Memorandum in support of its Motion.

The unsupported Motion was
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itself

of its

noticed-up for decision and decided by the Court on January 10,
1992. The District Court exercised its broad discretion, which it
has under Utah law, to deny the unsupported Motion.

Westlev vs.

Farmers Ins. Exchange, 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983).

In light of

the fact that the motion was unsupported by affidavits, facts, a
memorandum, any authority or legal argument contradicting the
facts, authority and arguments submitted by Union Park, it cannot
be said that the District Court abused its broad discretion in
denying the Motion.
B.

Gump 6 Ayers' delay in filing its Motion to Amend
is not excusable.

In its brief, Gump

& Ayers argues extensively

that it

believed, since the inception of this action, that it had been the
victim of a fraud. However, Gump & Ayers and its counsel go on to
argue that they felt constrained, by the requirements of Rule 11,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to investigate the issue further
before raising allegations of fraud.

These statements, and this

argument, are unsupported by the record.

Gump & Ayers has been

represented by the same counsel since the inception of this action.
The record is clear that Gump & Ayers and its counsel have always
felt that this was their only defense to Union Parkfs action.
(See~ Affidavit of Jerry Floor at Paragraph 18) (R. 195).

44

Gump & Ayers would also have this Court believe that it
finally learned of this fraud and promptly filed its Motion for
Leave to Amend.

Gump & Ayers argues:

On March 21, 1992, Gump & Ayers filed a Motion
to Amend its Answer to assert a Counterclaim
alleging the fraud which was now confirmed.
(Emphasis added).
This statement is somewhat misleading. The record establishes that
the "confirmation" to which Gump & Ayers refers is a copy of the
Lease Agreement between Union Park and the substitute tenant,
Matrix, Inc.

This lease was produced to Gump & Ayers with Union

Park's responses to their discovery requests, which responses were
delivered on January 14, 1991, five (5) weeks before Union Park
filed its Motion for Summary Judgment and over two (2) months
before Gump & Ayers filed its Motion for Leave to Amend (R. 19).
The record also establishes that Jerry Floor, President of Gump &
Ayers, was aware of the circumstances which gave rise to his
allegation of fraud, as far back as November 5, 1990.

There is

correspondence in the record, of that date, in which Mr. Floor sets
forth all of the factual allegations which he now states constitute
the basis of Gump & Ayers1 claim of fraudulent inducement (R. 275).
In summary, while Gump

& Ayers may argue that

it felt

restrained by Rule 11 from alleging fraud until such time as it had
confirmation, this position is not supported by the record. On the
contrary, the only evidence placed before the District Court was
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that introduced by Union Park, all of which evidence supports Union
Park's position that the information upon which Gump & Ayers bases
its allegation of fraudulent inducement was known to it long before
it filed its Motion for Leave to Amend. In light of this unexcused
and unexplained delay, the District Court properly denied the
Motion for Leave to Amend. See, Westley vs. Farmers Ins. Exchange.
663 P.2d 93 (Utah 1983).
C

The District Court gave full consideration to all evidence
of fraud, properly ruled that the evidence of fraud was
insufficient as a matter of law, thereby rendering Defendant's
Motion for Leave to Amend moot*
Gump & Ayers now argues that denial of its Motion for Leave to

Amend to include a claim for fraud prejudiced it because "the
denial of the motion effectively removed all evidence of fraud from
consideration by the lower court" (Appellee's Brief at Page 20).
This argument is clearly contradicted by the record. To rebut this
contention, a brief review of the procedural posture of the case is
necessary.
Though Union Parkfs Motion for Summary Judgment was filed
sixty (60) days prior to Gump & Ayers1 Motion for Leave to Amend,
both Motions were noticed-up for argument and decision on January
10,

1992.

At the hearing

of January

10#

1992, the Court

specifically stated as follows:
The matter comes before the Court today on
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.
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There is also pending Defendant's Motion to
Amend its Answer and assert a Counterclaim.
(Addendum Exhibit HClf at Page 1).

The Court went on to state that

it believed the issues relevant to both the Motion for Summary
Judgment and the Motion for Leave to Amend were intertwined
(Addendum Exhibit "C" at Pages 2 and 3) . Counsel for Gump & Ayers
stated his agreement, on the record, that the arguments were
intertwined and that argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment
would resolve all issues before the Court.
Mr. McDonald:
I think if we can hear the
Motion for Summary Judgment, and then if the
Court can open that up, I think Summary
Judgment
is
going
to
really
resolve
everything. They are all related to that.
(Addendum Exhibit "Clf at Page 4).
Appellant1s

only

defense

to

the

enforceability

of

the

Promissory Note that it admitted signing, was the affirmative
defense of fraud in the inducement. Consequently, the entirety of
Mr. McDonald's argument at the hearing of January 10, 1992 was
devoted to the issue of the alleged fraud, which Gump & Ayers now
disengenuously argues was never considered by the Court. (Addendum
Exhibit "C" at Pages 20-24 and 33).
Finally, the District Court made it perfectly clear that it
had given full consideration to Gump & Ayers1 arguments of the
alleged fraud.

The Court stated in its ruling "Frankly, I have

given the fraud claim considerable thought" (emphasis added) (R.
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437).

The Court then went on to deny Gump & Ayers1 Motion for

Leave to Amend as being moot in light of the fact that it granted
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.

After concluding, as a

matter of law that Gump & Ayers had not met its burden to show
fraud, the Court stated that it would make no sense Mto turn around
and say, "okay, now, amend your answer and include the counterclaim
on this very issue"..." (R. 443).

The Court reiterated its

position in response to Mr. McDonald's question about the denial of
Gump & Ayers1 Motion for Leave to Amend.
Mr. McDonald:
The problem I have, if the
Motion to Amend is not granted, then fraud
isn't before the Court on Summary Judgment.
The Court: Well, you defend [sic] it on that
basis and I considered it in that context. It
was a pending motion I reserved on that. I
indicated that I had read all of the pleadings
about it. Motion to amend is denied.
(R. 443).
Thus, Gump & Ayers1 contention that it was prejudice by denial
of its Motion for Leave to Amend is unsupported by the record and
meritless.

Denial of the Motion did not prevent the Court from

considering evidence of alleged fraud in the context of Union
Park's Motion for Summary Judgment.

Gump & Ayers' allegations of

fraud were at the very heart of its opposition to the Motion for
Summary Judgment. The Court having found that Gump & Ayers did not
meet its substantive burden on the allegations of fraud, properly
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granted Union Parkfs Motion for Summary Judgment.

The Court then

correctly decided that Gump & Ayers1 Motion for Leave to Amend was
therefore moot and properly denied Appellant's Motion.

These

rulings should be upheld by this Court.
POINT I?I
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT INTEREST ON THE
PROMISSORY NOTE WAS TO BE CALCULATED AT THE RATE OF
10% PER ANNUM
At the hearing of January 10, 1992 on Plaintiff's first Motion
for Summary Judgment, Judgment was granted in favor of Union Park
on the issue of liability.

The Court reserved

for further

proceedings the issues regarding determination of the appropriate
interest rate to be used in calculating the balance due and owing
on the Note.

The Court also reserved for further proceedings the

propriety of attorney's fees as an element of damages (R. 470,
471) . These issues were addressed by Plaintifffs Second Motion for
Summary Judgment filed on August 25, 1992 (R. 474). Union Park's
Second Motion for Summary Judgment was supported by a Memorandum,
as well as the Affidavit of Thomas Lloyd in support thereof (R. 477
and 502).

After obtaining an extension, Gump & Ayers filed a

Memorandum in Opposition supported by the Affidavit of Jerry Floor
(R. 549 and 553).

Gump & Ayers also filed a Cross-Motion for

Summary Judgment on the issue of the propriety of calculating the
note interest at the rate of 10% per annum (R. 566). Oral argument
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on the cross-motions was held on November 30, 1992.

The Court

granted Union Park's Motion for Summary Judgment on these issues
and denied Gump & Ayers1 Cross-Motion (R. 606). The Court properly
ruled that interest on the note was to be calculated at the rate of
10% per annum.
Union Park presented evidence through the Affidavit of Tom
Lloyd (R. 502) of the principal balance which remained due and
owing under the Note, which evidence was unopposed.

Union Park

also presented evidence supporting its claim to late fees and
attorneyfs fees.

Union Park prevailed on all of these issues (R.

606), none of which were appealed by Gump & Ayers.
However, Gump & Ayers continues to resist the ruling of the
Court that interest on the undisputed unpaid balance is to be
calculated on a per annum basis.
It is undisputed that the language of the Note provides for
interest at the rate of 10% (R. 8) . Relevant portions of the Note
read as follows:
This Note shall bear interest at the rate of
10% from and after May 1, 1988. Said sum
shall be due and payable to the holder hereof
in eighteen (18) monthly payments of principal
in the amount of $3,055.55, plus accrued
interest as of the date of each such payment.
(Addendum Exhibit

fl ft

B ).

The dispute arose as to the period over

which the interest should be calculated.

In response to Union

Park's Motion for Summary Judgment and in support of its own Cross50

Motion for Summary Judgment, Gump & Ayers argued that interest was
to be calculated at the rate of 10% per every forty-two (42) months
(R. 569) which it calls a "flat rate". Union Park argued that 10%
was to be calculated as a per annum interest rate (R. 580) based
upon application of § 15-1-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended).
The Court clearly ruled that the Note does not state the time
period over which interest is to be calculated.
And in this particular case, the language that
is relevant to the interest rate makes no
mention of a per annum interest rate.
It
doesn't make mention of a flat rate interest
rate either.
I don't think there is any
ambiguity about that contract in and of
itself, just that it's missing a term.
(R. 744, also Addendum Exhibit "D").

In supplying the missing

term, the District Court properly inserted the term "per annum"
into the contract.
There is a Utah statute which prescribes the period over which
interest is to be calculated when none is stated.

In that

situation, a per annum interest rate is required under § 15-1-3,
Utah Code Ann.. (1953 as amended), which provides:
Whenever in any... instrument... any certain
rate of interest is mentioned and no period of
time is stated, interest shall be calculated
at the rate mentioned bv the year. (Emphasis
added).
Research reveals no cases which have cited or interpreted
§ 15-1-3.

However, the State of Oklahoma has a statute which is
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analogous to the Utah statute which has been interpreted by the
Oklahoma Supreme Court, The Oklahoma statute reads in its entirety
as follows:
When a rate of interest is prescribed by a law
or contract, without specifying the period of
time by which such rate is to be calculated,
it is to be deemed an annual rate.
Okla. Stat. Ann. Tit., 15 § 265.
This statute was interpreted by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
in the case of Jackson vs. Fennemore. 230 P. 689 (Okla. 1924), in
which enforcement was sought of a promissory note which accrued
interest at the rate of "...10% interest from date". Like the Note
before this Court, it specified the percentage rate of interest and
the date after which interest was to accrue.

However, it did not

specify the period pursuant to which the 10% rate was to be
calculated.

Id. at 690. This is identical to the present case in

which the Note provides for interest at the rate of 10% and a date
certain after which it is to accrue (May 1, 1988) (R. 8). Under
these circumstances, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma determined that
no period for calculation was provided in the note and it relied on
the

statute

cited

above

in ruling

that

interest

was to be

calculated on a "per annum" basis. The court specifically stated:
This [referring to 15 § 265] we think is
decisive of the question raised, and is ample
to justify the court in rendering judgment for
10% per annum... (Emphasis added).
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Id. at 691.
The District Court properly determined that the period over
which the 10% interest was to be calculated was a missing term (R.
744).

The Court then noted that generally a court will not insert

missing terms into a contract, as a matter of law.

However, it

will make such an insertion when the legislature, through statutory
enactment,

has

mandated

a

particular

term

to

be

inserted.

Thereupon, and in reliance on § 15-1-3, the Court ruled that
interest was to be calculated at the rate of 10% per annum.

The

court specifically stated:
As I look at the statute, and looking at this
Promissory Note, it appears to me that the
Plaintifffs position is well taken. That the
statute does control in this case, does
provide the court a justification
for
inserting a term in the contract. The parties
are not entitled to a better contract than the
one that they entered into, and generally
courts do not imply terms or read terms or add
terms to a contract.
But in this case, I
think the legislature has done just that.
(R. 745, also Addendum Exhibit W D M ) .

The District Court properly

applied the statute to supply the missing term, since contracts are
presumed to incorporate within their terms law existing at the time
the contract is entered into. McKinlev vs. Prudential Property and
Cas. Ins. Co. , 619 P.2d 1269 (Okla. App. 1980), Beehive Medical
Electronics, Inc. vs. Industrial Com'n. 583 P.2d 53 (Utah 1978) and
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Ouaaliana vs. Exquisite Home Builders. Inc., 638 P.2d 301 (Utah
1975).
The Note states the percentage interest rate of 10%. The Note
also states the date on which interest begins to accrue (May 1,
1988). However, the Note does not state the time period over which
interest is to be calculated.
interpret

the Note

and make

There is no possible way to
sense

of all

of

its remaining

provisions if a "flat" rate is imposed. Appellant offers no method
of calculating a "flat rate" nor offers how its interpretation is
consistent with the other provisions of the Note.

However, by

inserting the "per annum" period prescribed by § 15-1-3, the Note
makes

sense.

It makes the

following

language

of the Note

consistent and logical:
Said sum shall be due and payable to the
holder hereof in eighteen
(18) monthly
payments of principal in the amount of
$3,055.55 plus accrued interest as of the date
of each such payment. (Emphasis added).
(Addendum Exhibit "B").

The Utah statute prescribes that, if such

a term is missing, interest is to be calculated on an annual basis.
Therefore, the Courtfs ruling that the "period" term of the Note
was missing was proper and the Court correctly ruled that interest
on the undisputed unpaid principal should be calculated on a per
annum basis.

This ruling should be affirmed by this Court.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the two rulings of the Third Judicial
District Court in favor of Plaintiff Union Park Associates in
connection with its Motion for Summary Judgment. First, this Court
should conclude that the District Court properly found Gump & Ayers
liable under the Settlement Agreement and Promissory Note.

In so

doing, this Court should affirm that the District Court properly
applied the substantive burden test by resolving all disputes of
fact in favor of Gump & Ayers and thereafter finding that Gump &
Ayers still failed to show fraud by clear and convincing evidence,
thereby

failing to raise a material issue to defeat Summary

Judgment.

Even if this Court declines to adopt the substantive

burden test, it should still affirm the ruling on liability as Gump
& Ayers still failed to raise a material issue of fact.
Second, this Court should

find that the District Court

properly considered Gump & Ayers1 allegations of fraud and properly
denied its Motion for Leave to Amend.
Third, this Court should affirm the ruling of the District
Court granting damages in favor of Union Park and specifically
finding that interest under the Promissory Note should accrue at a
rate of 10% per annum.

In so doing, this Court should affirm the

Order and Judgment (R. 606) wherein Plaintiff was awarded Judgment
as against Defendant in the amount of $35,175.59 as of July 9,
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1990, with interest accruing thereon at the rate of 10% per annum
thereafter

until

paid

in

full,

together

with

the

award

of

attorney's fees and costs in the total amount of $7,220.50, plus
interest thereon at the contract rate of 10% per annum from the
date of entry of Judgment until paid in full.
Further, Union Park Associates is entitled to its attorney's
fees

and

costs

pursuant

to

the

Note

between

the parties.

Therefore, this matter should be remanded to the District Court for
determination

and

award

of

additional

costs

and

additional

attorney's fees incurred in responding to this Appeal.
G.G.A. , Inc. vs. Leventis, 773 P.2d

841

(See,

(Utah App. 1989)).

Finally, Gump & Ayers has posted a Supersedeas Bond pursuant to
which Union Park Associates is stayed from execution pending
outcome of this Appeal.

That Stay should be lifted and the Bond

should be released to Union Park Associates forthwith.
DATED this

day of May, 1993.
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C.

mark S. Swan
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
Union Park Associates
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the ^j^

day of May, 1993, I caused

a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon the
following parties by placing the same in the United States mails,
postage prepaid, addressed as follows:
Robert M. McDonald
MCDONALD, WEST & BENSON
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
455 East 500 South
Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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EXHIBIT "A"

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
AND
MUTUAL RELEASE OF CLAIMS
This Settlement Agreement/and Mutual Release of Claims is
entered into this 7th day ofNfelQyembQr, 1988, by and between
Union Park Associates (hereinafter, "Union Park") and Gump &
Ayers Real Estate, Inc. (hereinafter, "Gump & Ayers").
1. On June 28, 1985, Union Park, as landlord, and Gump &
Ayers, as tenant, entered into a certain Lease Agreement for the
lease of approximately 912 sq. ft. of the second floor of the
office building located at approximately 1150 East Fort Union
Boulevard, Midvale, Utah. That Lease Agreement provides for a
term of eight years and eight months. A copy of said Lease is
attached hereto as Exhibit "B"
2. On June 1, 1983, Union Park, as landlord, and Gump &
Ayers, as tenant, entered into a certain Lease Agreement for the
lease of approximately 4,567 sq. ft. of the second floor of the
office building located at approximately 1150 East Forth Union
Boulevard, Midvale, Utah. That Lease Agreement provides for a
term of ten years and eight months. A copy of said Lease is
attached hereto as Exhibit "C".
AGREEMENT AND RELEASE OF CLAIMS
In consideration of the mutual promises set forth below and
with the intent of being legally bound, the parties hereto agree
as follows:
3. Payment. Upon execution of this Agreement, (a) Gump &
Ayers will pay to Union Park the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars
($10,000); (b) on December 15, 1988, Gump & Ayers will pay to
Union Park an additional sum of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000);
in addition, (c) Upon the execution of this Agreement Gump &
Ayers will execute and deliver to Union Park a Promissory Note in
the form attached hereto as Exhibit "A", and will pay to Union
Park the additional sum of Fifty-Five Thousand Dollars ($55,000)
on the terms, and in the manner, set forth in said Promissory
Note.
4. Mutual General Releases. (a) For and in consideration
of the mutual covenants contained herein and other good and
valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is
hereby acknowledged, Union Park, for itself, its successors and
assigns, does hereby fully and forever release, acquit and
discharge Gump & Ayers, its successors, assigns and any others
who have acted or who are acting on its behalf, from any and all
claims, demands, obligations, liabilities, causes of action or
any suits at law or equity, whether known or unknown to Union
Park, which Union Park may have against Gump & Ayers which claims
arise from any act or omission of Gump & Ayers committed prior to
the date of this Agreement, the Lease Agreements specified in

Paragraphs Nos. 1 and 2, above, the occupation of the leased
premises by Gump & Ayers and/or the use of the leased premises by
Gump Sc Ayers.
(b) For and in consideration of the mutual covenants
contained herein and other good and valuable consideration, the
receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, Gump &
Ayers, for itself, its successors and assigns, does hereby fully
and forever release, acquit and discharge Union Park, its
successors, assigns and any others who have acted or who are
acting on its behalf from any and all claims, demands,
obligations, liabilities, causes of action or any suits at law or
equity, whether known or unknown to Gump & Ayers which Gump &
Ayers may have against Union Park which claims arise from any act
or omission of Union Park, the Lease Agreements specified in
paragraphs Nos. 1 and 2, above, the occupation of the leased
premises by Gump & Ayers and the use of the leased premises by
Gump & Ayers.
5. Rescission of Lease. For the consideration of the
covenants contained herein, the parties agree that the lease
agreements specified in paragraphs nos. 1 and 2, above, are
hereby mutually rescinded and that except as provided in this
agreement, both parties are hereby released from any and all
obligation contained within said lease agreements.
6. Default. In the event Gump & Ayers shall default in a
payment of $10,000.00 due on December 15, 1988 as set forth in
paragraph 3 above, such payments shall be subject to a late
charge at a rate equal to 18 percent per annum until paid. Any
default in the payment of any sum set forth in the Promissory
Note shall be subject to the late fee as set forth within the
Promissory Note. In the event either party defaults in the
performance of any term of this Agreement, the defaulting party
agrees to pay all reasonable attorney's fees and court costs
incurred by the non-defaulting party.
The mutual releases contained herein and the mutual recision
of the Lease Agreements contained herein are dependant upon the
full performance by Gump & Ayers of its obligations contained in
this Agreement and contained in the Promissory Note. In the
event Gump & Ayers defaults in any of its obligations set forth
in this Agreement or the performance of any obligation set forth
in the Promissory Note, Union Park Associates shall be entitled,
by its election, to retain all funds received prior to the
default and to either (1) its actual damages under the Lease
Agreements less all funds received under this Agreement and
Promissory Note prior to the default or (2) the full
consideration a6 provided in thi6 agreement and the Promissory
Notes.
7.

Union Park and Gump & Ayers acknowledge that this
2

compromise and release has been entered into freely and with the
advice of counsel and that no representations of fact or opinion
has been made by either party or by anyone acting in their behalf
to induce this compromise with respect to the nature of their
claims and damages.
DATED this

lT

day of •Move.mbeg/ 1988.
UNION PARK ASSOCIATES

By
GUMP & AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC.

Id uniogump.rel

EXHIBIT "B

PROMISSORY NOTE
$55,000.00
Principal Amount

December -Movombeg _ 7 _ , 1988

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned hereby promises to pay
to the order of UNION PARK ASSOCIATES, 6925 Union Park Center,
Suite 500, Midvale, Utah 84047, the sum of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND
AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($55,000.00). This note shall bear interest
at the rate of ten percent (10%) from and after May 1, 1988.
Said sum shall be due and payable to the holder hereof in
eighteen (18) monthly payments of principal in the amount of
$3,055.55 plus accrued interest as of the date of each such
payment.
Said payments to be made as follows: Payments shall
commence on May 1, 1989 and continue thereafter, on the first day
on each successive month, through and including the month of
October, 1989. No payment shall be due for the months of
November, 1989 through April, 1990. Thereafter, payments shall
be due, as stated above, commencing on May 1, 1990 and continuing
thereafter, on the first day of each successive month through and
including the month of October, 1990. No payment shall be due
for the months of November, 1990 through April, 1991.
Thereafter, payments shall be due as stated above, commencing on
May 1, 1991 and continuing thereafter on the 1st day of each
successive month until all principal and accrued interest is paid
in full.
This note may be prepaid in whole or in part without
penalty.
This note shall at the option of any holder hereof be
immediately due and payable upon the occurrence of any of the
following:
1. Failure to make any payment due hereunder within 15 days
of its due date.
2. Brea< .: of any condition of the Security Agreement on
property granted as collateral or security for this note.
3. Upon the filing by the undersigned of an assignment for
the benefit of creditors, bankruptcy, or for relief under any
provisions of the Federal Bankruptcy Code; or by suffering an
involuntary petition in bankruptcy or receivership to be filed
and not vacated within 30 days.
In the event this note shall be in default, and placed with
an attorney for collection, then the undersigned agrees to pay
all reasonable attorney fees and costs of collection. Payments

not made within five (5) days of due date shall be subject to a
late charge of-1.5% of said payment. All payments hereunder
shall be made to the address set forth above or to such address
as may from time to time be designated by any holder hereof.
The undersigned agrees to remain fully bound hereunder until
this note shall be fully paid. The undersigned further waives
demand, presentment and protest and all notices thereto and
further agrees*to remain bound, notwithstanding any extension,
modification, waiver or other indulgence by any holder or upon
the exchange, substitution, or release of any collateral granted
as security for this note. No modification or indulgence by any
holder hereof shall be binding unless in writing; and any
indulgence on any one occasion shall not be an indulgence for any
other future occasion.
The rights of any holder hereof shall be
cumulative and not necessarily successive. This note shall be
construed, governed and enforced in accordance with the laws of
the State of Utah.
This note is subject to a Security Agreement of even date.
GUMP & AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC.

President

Id uniogump.not

EXHIBIT "C

1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

2

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3
4
UNION PARK ASSOCIATES
5
6

Transcript of:

Plaintiff,

7

HEARING
vs.

8
9

GUMP & AYERS REAL ESTATE, INC.
Defendant.

10

Case No. 900906725

11
The

12

above-entitled

cause

of

action

came

on

13

regularly for hearing before the Honorable Anne M. Stirba.

14

a Judge of the Third Judicial District Court of the State

15

of Utah, at Salt Lake County, Utah, on Friday, January 10,

16

1992.

17

APPEARANCES

18
19

For the Plaintiff:

MARK S. SWAN
RICHER. SWAN & OVERHOLT
311 South State #350
Salt Lake City, Utah

For the Defendant:

ROBERT M. MCDONALD
MCDONALD & BULLEN
455 East 500 South #200
Salt Lake City, Utah

20
21
22
23
24
25

1

FRIDAY, JANUARY 1 0 , 1992

2

2 : 0 0 P.M.

P R O C E E D I N G S

3

THE COURT:

Good afternoon.

Let's go on the

4

record in the matter of Union Park vs. Gump & Ayers Real

5

Estate, Incorporated, case No. 900906725.

6

you state your appearances.

7

MR. SWAN:

Mark Swan representing the

8

plaintiff, Union Park Associates.

9

MR. MCDONALD:

10

Counsel, would

Robert McDonald representing the

defendant, Gump & Ayers.

11

THE COURT:

All right, thank you.

The matter

12

comes before the Court today on the Plaintiff's Motion

13

for Summary Judgment.

14

Motion to Amend its Answer and Assert a Counterclaim.

15

There is a Motion for Relief in Judgment which the

16

plaintiff filed following the Court's ruling, I believe,

17

on July 18 of 1991.

18

There is also pending Defendant's

I indicated by way of minute entry that I would

19

reconsider that motion for the reason that although the

20

docket sheet indicated that a Memorandum in Opposition

21

had been filed by the plaintiffs, that the memorandum was

22

not a part of the file and consequently was not
i.

I

23

considered by the Court at the time I issued that ruling

24

on July the 18th.

25

indicated by way of minute entry that I would.

So I would reconsider that. I

I presume that the parties haven't been able to
reach some kind of an agreement about that; is that
correct?
MR. SWAN:

Well, Your Honor, our Motion to

Reconsider your order granting the Motion to Amend has
not been opposed.
THE COURT: Right.
MR. SWAN:
problem with that.

So I presume that there is no
I think it is a court clerical error

that the order was ever entered because clearly the
memorandum was on file and for somehow it got lost
because it had never been put on the computer.
THE COURT:

I have already said I am going to

reconsider it, but I was wondering, I presume there has
been no agreement then with respect to the Motion to
Amend the amendment?
MR. SWAN:
THE COURT:

That is correct, there has not been.
All right.

MR. MCDONALD:

I, think it is still disputed and

we will address that.
THE COURT:

Still seems very much in dispute.

What we are going to do today with that is I am going to
reserve ruling on that particular issue until after
argument on the Motion for Summary Judgment.

I don't

think we need to rule to have argument specifically with
2

1

the Motion to Amend.

I am aware of how the issues

2

intertwine.

3

Summary Judgment.

4

have read your memoranda on that, and you may proceed.

5

MR. SWAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

I would like you to argue the Motion for
I have read all of the affidavits. I

Your Honor,

6

if it please the Court, I am going to stand here because

7

I have so many documents that I may need to refer to in

8

this oral statement.

9

THE COURT:

10

you and I can hear you.

11

MR. SWAN:

12

enough.

13

slow.

14

Just as long as Dorothy can hear

Okay.

Well I usually talk loud

It is usually too fast, so I will try to keep it

I think it is important in conjunction with

15

this whole matter, because I think there are six motions

16

before the Court, to understand the timetable of the

17

pleadings and procedure in this matter.

18

THE COURT:

19

MR. SWAN:

20

THE COURT:

Six motions?
I think so, yes.
I think there is the Motion for

21

Summary Judgment, Motion to Amend, and then the Motion

22

for Consideration to Relief of Judgment.

23

of other motions.

24
25

I am not aware

MR. SWAN: There is Motions to Strike
Affidavits, Motions for Protective Order, Motions to

1

Compel, and all of these things are part and parcel,

2 I

really > of the controversy surrounding the Hot ion for

3

Summary Judgment.

4
5

THE COURT: When was the Motion to Strike —
Oh, the affidavit of John Parsons.

6

MR. SWAN:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. SWAN:

9

THE COURT: Was there a Notice to Submit

10

That is correct.
All right, very well.
Anyway, if I may —

submitted on the Motion to Compel?

11

MR. SWAN:

12 ]

Motion to Compel.

13

not.

14

I think this is the Defendant's
I am not sure whether there waB or

MR. MCDONALD:

The way that arose, Your Honor,

15

is we submitted some discovery and I believe there was a

16

motion that inasmuch as the summary judgment was pending,

17

that they ought not to have to answer that until the

18

disposition of the motion, if I recall correctly.

19

basically I think we are.really dust here.

20

can hear the Motion for Summary Judgment, and then if the

21

Court can open that up, I think the summary judgment is

22 I

going to really resolve everything. They are all related

23

to that.

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. SWAN:

And

I think if we

All right, go ahead.
Thank you, Your Honor.

As the Court

1

is probably well aware, the complaint in this matter was

2

filed on November 14, 1990, a little over a year ago.

3

was served on November 23rd.

4

Answer on December 13th. With their Answer, they filed

5

their first set of Interrogatories and Requests for

6

Production of Documents.

7

those and the responses were filed or the Certificate of

8

Service was filed January 10th, so within the 30-day

9

period.

The defendants filed an

And then my client responded to

Nothing happened after that response to the

10

discovery and so on February 21st, 40 days later or so,

11

we filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.

12

month later —

13
14

THE COURT:

Thereafter, a

I believe it was January, not

February, but go ahead, I thought it was.

15

MR. SWAN:

16

THE COURT: Well, never mind.

17

It

Motion for Summary Judgment?
It doesn't

matter.

18

MR. SWAN:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. SWAN:

My motion says February 21st.
Okay, you are right.
So some time period passed from our

21

Answer to the motion, and I think that becomes relevant

22

if we ever get to the Motion to Amend issue because there

23

was plenty of time for the defendants to amend their

24

pleadings before filing a Motion for Summary Judgment.

25

They responded to our Motion for Summary

Judgment on March 21st, and at the same time filed a
Motion to Amend on the same date.
Our Motion for Summary Judgment, I think, is
quite straightforward.

And I realize the Court has dust

an enormous amount of paper and, to be honest with you,
part of that was done to help educate the defendant as to
the numbers behind this whole case; but I think the legal
issues are quite easy.
What is at issue is whether or not the
defendant is liable under a promissory note which was
executed as part of the whole Settlement Agreement
package.

The promissory note was executed on December 8,

1988 in a principal amount of $55,000.

It bears interest

at 10 percent and it has an interesting payment schedule:
18 payments of $3,055.55, but they're not monthly
payments.

They are skip-months in there and those

payments are identified as principal payments.

The way

the note is written, in addition to the principai
payments, you are supposed to pay accrued interest with
that payment as of the date of the payments.
The Settlement Agreement was executed because
the defendant had entered into a commercial lease
agreement with the plaintiff to lease premises at Union
Park in Midvale.

And there are two leases, one was eight

years and one was ten years on two separate suites. They
6

vacated the premises in May of 1988, leaving at least six
years left on the lease. A Settlement Agreement was
finally executed eight months after they vacated the
premises and there was eight months' rent due at the
time.

The rental payment due at the time on the total

amount of premises being leased by the defendant was
$7,733.37.
The Settlement Agreement says that the parties
are releasing each other of all of their rights and
obligations under the lease agreement and for any number
of known claims in exchange for the defendant paying the
plaintiff a total of $65,000:

$10,000 down, and

execution of a promissory note.
At the time of the execution of that promissory
note and Settlement Agreement, the total amount due in
past due rent was $61,866.96. And so what the defendant
was agreeing to do was pay the $65,000: p a y

$61,000 for

past due rent, and a small portion for future liability,
slightly over $3,000.
Their potential pliability under the lease was a
half million dollars.
THE COURT: You are just saying that that is
accord and satisfaction?
MR. SWAN: That is correct.
THE COURT: Okay.
7

1

MR. SWAN:

Now the defendant does not dispute

2

the most recent accounting submitted by a supplemental

3

affidavit of Tom Lloyd regarding the amount due under the

4

promissory note.

5

provided evidence of some payments that we have now taken

6

into account and have filed a supplemental accounting and

7

have come up with a figure that is due under the

8

promissory note of $35,352.46 as of July 16, 1990.

9

In their initial response, they

We have also filed an affidavit of fees and

10

costs through June 6, 1991 of $4,083.50.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. SWAN:

13

How much was that?
$4,083.50. Now some additional fees

and costs have been incurred since that date.

14

Their defense to liability is not that they

15

didn't sign the note or not that they paid in full.

16

fact, they admit that they have not paid in full: but it

17

is fraud in the inducement.

18

used.

19

"In order to induce Gump & Ayers to pay a sum of money

20

for future rents, plaintiff falsely stated to Gump &

21

Ayers the leased premises were still vacant, with no

22

In

That is the term that they

And their own Memorandum in Opposition says that

prospect of future tenants."

So that is the allegation

i

I

23

of fraud in the inducement, that they were induced to pay

24

this $3,100 for future rents by the statement that the

25

premises were vacant.

We believe that this defense is
8

not well supported either at law or by the evidence that
they have raised.
First of all, we think the Settlement Agreement
expressly waives each and every claim, including this
claim that they were not told about the current status of
the tenancy of the property.

Secondly, we do not think

that their fraud in the inducement claim is sufficiently
pled by law because they have not pled each of the
elements.

Nor have they shown by the clear and

convincing evidence requirement that they have, that
there was a fraud.
Settlement Agreements such as were entered into
in this matter, have been construed quite often by the
Utah Court and by other courts, and they have all been
said to be favored at law.

They are valued because they

resolve disputes that have unliquidated liability, such
as was with this case.

There was not a very good ability

to determine the defendant's continuing liability on the
lease and so Settlement Agreement liquidated that
liability.
The case law also suggests, as cited in our
memorandum, that in order to set aside the Settlement
Agreement, the very strongest reasons must be shown and
only by clear and convincing evidence.

If I might refer

to the Settlement Agreement, there are two paragraphs I
9

I which says, "Gump & Ayere
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did:. . r ely , they cannot now change their mind and say,
10

1

M

2

are a sophisticated company.

3

of counsel and were fully informed.

4

We did rely."

I think it is also important that they
They admit they had advice

The fraud by which the defendant is alleging

5

that the plaintiff committed must be pled

with

6

particularity.

7

elements as identified in our memorandum.

8

representation, which is known to be false, or an

9

omission of a material fact to induce action, and actual

Fraud in the inducement have four
False

10

and justifiable reliance.

11

clear and convincing evidence even in contesting a Motion

12

for Summary Judgment.

13

And this must be known by

The only false representation that is raised by

14

this defendant is raised by Jerry Floor's affidavit in

15

paragraph 7 where he says it was falsely represented to

16

him that the property was vacant.

17

any fact that shows that the property was not vacant at

18

the time that he alleges the representation was made.

19
20

THE COURT:

They have not raised

So your position is that can"t be

fraud in the inducement?

21

MR. SWAN:

That is correct.

22

THE COURT:

Even if true?

23

MR. SWAN:

Correct, because he is saying, "I

24

relied on the fact that it was vacant."

If it was

25

vacant, there has been no misstatement, no misleading
11

„ uncontrovei I i I iui I t\ in i I lit i i . i>>-1 i

statemenx
vacant

-

<"> r
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nil Il I I
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following year.
But I think more importantly than whether
*

^- ^
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And
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changed their decision-making process at nil,
THE COURT
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y
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It

dated

/*.*i*s tor past a^e it-riis.

At most, it had some effect on what they were agreeing
:l 2

I Ji: I ,

1

pay for future liability.

2

they only agreed to pay $3,100 on future liability to get

3

release from a potential half million dollars of

4

liability.

5

have had any effect on their decision to pay $3,100 for

6

future rents.

7

what they agreed to pay to compromise their future

8

liability.

9

And the facts are clear that

There is no showing that that statement would

In fact, four-tenths of a month's rent is

Now, there is some implication that the

10

plaintiff should have told the defendant that they were

11

negotiating for a new tenant and thereby, although it is

12

not explicitly stated, that maybe Union Park had a duty

13

to speak and to keep the defendant informed of these

14

other negotiations for tenancy of the property.

15

THE COURT: Well, if I understand you

16

correctly, Mr. Swan, your position is not only is there

17

no duty but, in fact, if anything, there was a duty to

18

try to mitigate, is that right, damages by attempting to

19

re-let the property?

20

MR. SWAN:

That is correct.

The case that says

21

that there is a duty to mitigate is, I think, it is Reed

22

vs. Mutual of Omaha case which didn't come down until

23

after the Settlement Agreement.

24

in the State of Utah whether there was an actual duty to

25

mitigate, but at least the plaintiff was doing something.

And so it wasn't clear

13

3

knd n ill ifcy to er^?> ^equirer -t-h^4* ^^^re must be either a

*
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*
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14

1

They do not dispute the amount that is due.

2

Attorney's fees are allowed under the note.

3

The accord and satisfaction waives the very claim that

4

they are now making that they were not relying on

5

representations, where in fact now they are alleging they

6

were doing so.

7

evidence.

8

show fraud in the inducement.

9

that some statement was made and have not fulfilled their

10

And most basically, there is just no

They have not brought forth any evidence to
They have just alleged

legal duty to make those specific facts.

11

And I think it is quite clear that we could not

12

have fraudulently induced them to agree to pay the past

13

due amount.

14

induced to pay that amount.

15

obviously due, and that was $61,866.96.

16

signed the Settlement Agreement, they owed that much.

17

at most, if they were induced fraudulently with regard to

18

any dollar figure, it is the difference between that

19

amount and the 65,000, which they agreed to pay, or

20

$3,100.

21
22
23

They owed it. They couldn't be fraudulently
And so that amount is quite
The date they
So

THE COURT: Well, you are not suggesting you
can divide that out, separate that out, are you?
MR. SWAN:

Well, their specific allegation is

24

that we were fraudulently induced to pay a sum on the

25

future rents; and so I think it needs to be clear that
15
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MR. SWAN'

• •;^:-

'THE COURT:

\ . . a n .-:. u.r ptiri
f

1 1 ., I 1 i correct.
Okay.

And Included, I n that,

i,c amount which they say they u*r,

^ v admit they "'WP and then the balance * F* whatever

MR. SWAN
r

for Summary Judgment, you are :\
"^ni **••* *-v- * w e r e . n, fact
. _, w e r e

j

suggesting that it :

. * .' •

i i f ac -

• »

.

somehow there is n question as

"ir that I should
iib I., 0 00 a,:i i, i

•*-- balance, you are

sugges + ; .- •
MR. SWAN

y m g :o suggest is
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I

w h e n ywu iuvr.
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-
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the

m a t e r i a l i t y issue and it is just n o t m a t e r i a l b e c a u s e
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1

their liability was so large, a half million dollars,

2

that they have not shown anything that would have

3

suggested that agreeing to pay an extra $3,100 would have

4

changed their decision one way or another.

5

think it goes to whether that is a material fact or not.

6

And so that is the reason I raise that.

7

that this whole lawsuit, they are trying to escape

8

liability, if you read their Answer and their

9

Counterclaim, for the full promissory note, the full

And so I

I just think

10

settlement agreement.

And I think that is somewhat of a

11

smoke screen because they couldn't have been fraudulently

12

induced to agree to pay something that they owed.

13

there is just not the materiality that they seem to

14

suggest.

And so

And then I will save some time for rebuttal.

15

THE COURT:

Okay, thank you.

16

MR. MCDONALD:

Mr. McDonald.

Thank you, Your Honor.

As

17

counsel points out, Your Honor, this action was commenced

18

on November 14, 1990. The complaint seeks recovery under

19

a promissory note dated December 8, 1988, for the

20

principal sum of $55,000.

21

the circumstances giving rise to the execution of the

22

note was the fact that there was a pre-existing lease

23

between the plaintiff and defendant.

24

Gump & Ayers entered into the lease, they were expanding

25

their business operation later because, obviously the

It is important to note that

At that time when

17

real estate marl,.

:;;

iv

they terminated the lease \-. • d\ anc* :f the specified
i• I

I

11 111

i« 11

ni I

11 ni i

t 1 in ni r

1 1 1 ! • f ni t - m i p. e r

vin p

v a c a t e d ,

they iuliv realized their responsibilities:, under the
i^ase and they were fully advised, and ther*- :s

no

. At • :.- time the plaintiff filed the complaint
alleging liability tinder the note, we fi led an Answer.
!:: 1 1 E I 1 Z • t E ll t Z ' 111 3 S' Dllie
hearsay n€ naa hearv

..

cue affidavl
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me, DUI

r

±na

:.e * in me
f

-

-

:• notea in

-

•-*-• >- * - M

. i..:-.

. 3

he had reason \. D believe that he had been defrauded.
That 1 i !: entered into one c ' premises that . ** vacatea.
• acated, had i, ' \*

on the representation that
«..t

L:.JL;

r- .-• *

^xe.u* - , :,,. Lromissor, *.. i

.

AVPTP

h_ _
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.... * «

*

-.

.. .

of thi? future r»-,:.t : n&T V*M. *therwise would be obligated
-)

believe that,

-

negotiated and executed

lease
• •.

undefined future liability

. already been
f

in*

- :::gnrcL M;v

h.:- oasi* :a

statement he had heard at a party.

^.

i

Pursuant to my
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1

obligations under Rule 11, I did not feel justified in

2

asserting a serious claim of fraud on the basis of

3

something he had heard at a cocktail party.

4

Answer, I specifically

5

THE COURT:

So in the

—
I am aware you reserved —

6

that observation in your Answer.

7

MR. MCDONALD:

All right.

made

So in that

8

circumstance, I filed the Answer and merely reserved

9

that, not asserting it because of my Rule 11

10
11

responsibilities.
I get back a Motion for Summary Judgment, and

12

they say, "It is a promissory note.

13

you executed the note, so we want judgment."

14

point in time I conduct a little informal discovery and

15

also review the documents that they have submitted in

16

support of this motion.

17

November 23rd, in fact, they had re-leased the premises

18

to a company called "Matrix" who has some overlapping

19

directorates that are obviously are affiliated companies.

20

So at that point in time, realizing now I have a clear

21

claim for fraud, I move to amend my complaint.

22

to lower it to a promissory note case.

23
24
25

THE COURT:

You have admitted
So at that

It is then I discover that on

They want

What is the representation

specifically that you allege was made that was false?
MR. MCDONALD:

Representation was made that the
19
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7
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8
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16
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Tom Lloyd,
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- negotiated this on
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execute this promissory note and pay me some cash, I will
:f
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18
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1

In any event, the worse case scenario, the

2

premises had been relet.

So the plaintiff's statement to

3

my client that it hadn't been relet was false.

4

noted in the affidavit, we would not have entered into

5

that promissory note and we don't agree that there is

6

only $3,000 in this dispute.

7

past rent, inasmuch as this is a promissory note case,

8

rather than a collection of a lease case, I haven't

9

shurned the case to answer that, but there are many

And as

The calculations for the

10

disputes on how much was attributable to future rent and

11

how much was attributable to past rents. And I think our

12 J

calculations are in the affidavit.

13

In any event, after filing the Summary

14

Judgment, we found that this evidence, and it is now

15

asserted and the cases are clear, if in fact that

16

promissory note was procured by fraud, and this fraud

17

being that the premises were not relet and that we were

18

going to be liable for an unspecified amount of time, it

19

must be cured by fraud.

20

the Settlement Agreement that we didn't rely on anything,

21

or that we are waiving and releasing each other of all

22

rights, are still the effects of fraud.

23

the assumption of the good-faith representation that the

24

property hadn't been relet.

25

The notion that they put into

We were under

Since that time there has been all kinds of
21

moves to prevent us from
preventing u s fror

io •

;.

and

.g affidavits because the

• <. mattei ^ ,

.,*..

A

.ae^vca and

should oe
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question
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J n. * ir
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rib* iv*-
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1

*l^H

w* v;->-^ Induced, frauduler~

questicr cf t a r :
1
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^as sai .1
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+

w

;

induced

* •

iat the Court sitting

ltnout a u-ier ui fact can resolve the issue at,

Apart from the fraud i ssue, there are other
substant:! e ] auesti c ne z f fact.
T! IE COURT:

A] J

I gi 1 1 •• :! • I:' I understand you

-"•

correctly then, as tc • fraud your claim, is that the false
1 31 T ese 1 it ta t:i • ::: .1 1 M as ma • ::ie t 3 I li

I "I o ^ ::i at tl le 12 me :»f 1: he

1 iegotiations ai id settlement agreement.

Ai e yo u claiming

any other basis for fraud?
TvniAi.ii

ill

11 1 1

111

1

t iii

( 11 1

1 I

1

1

told th5*4" ;•*- premises were 111 1 ] eased and there was no
prospect for lease, when in fact it had been leased.
22

That is the whole purpose for signing the note, otherwise
we would have paid the past rent.
THE COURT:

And you are not contending that

there was a material omission in the face of a duty? Mr.
Swan has argued that alternatively and I haven't heard
you respond to that.

How do you answer that?

MR. MCDONALD:

I think in the factual picture,

and again we are going without having a trial to call all
of the witnesses, that obviously if one makes a statement
that the premises are not relet, or even if he fell short
of that, saying, "You are going to be subjected to
liability for future unpaid rent," that would result then
in a minimum obligation to disclose, even if it occurred
at a later date that the premises had been rented.
THE COURT: Well, but Mr. Swan has argued the
law states that a duty arises where there is a special
relationship, fiduciary relationship, where there can be
undue influence or if there is a statutory duty.

Do you

argue with his analysis of the law?
MR. MCDONALD:

Not if it is based on duty.

I

am basing an omission to state a material fact on the
grounds of not any fiduciary duty between the parties
because they are arm's-length tenant-landlord.

The

problem arises —
THE COURT:

There has to be an omission in the
23
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r
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November 23rd *

leased the premises, I! llrfnk Rt that
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r
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i

JiiJiiuse

m a t wiitti m •

;. 'fie prior occasion is no longer true.

Rather than

mi 'n ir 11e lief about what he
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said that there were no prospective tenants.
Apart from the fraud issue, I think there is a
dispute as to the payments made by defendant prior to
discovering the fraud.
paragraph 7.

That is noted in our memorandum,

There is another factual dispute.

There

are disputes concerning the computations of the amounts
due and owing, assuming the note is enforceable.

Those

are addressed in paragraph 10 of our memorandum.

There

are disputes concerning the duration of the lease
payments, noted in paragraph 19 of our memorandum.

There

are factual disputes concerning the times of negotiations
of the promissory note, which may bear on the very thing
we are talking about and that is in paragraph 20 of the
memorandum.

There are disputes as to the number and

amount of lease payments, paragraph 21 of our memorandum.
There are disputes as to the amount of the lease payments
that were due and owing, paragraph 23 and 24 of our
memorandum.

There are disputes as to the offer of the

Settlement Agreement on the promissory note, because
there is some ambiguity in it. One says it is a per annum
interest rate and the note says it is a flat rate.

That

is one dispute that will have to be resolved by parol
evidence, which isn't appropriate for a summary judgment
because it depends on what you believe.

There are

critical matters which defendant has not had the
25

opportunity -1-- Investigate ^Y^*- 'are noted

~ paragraph 3 2
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testimr

9
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1

inappropriate.

Thank you.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. SWAN:

All right, thank you, Mr. McDonald.
I would like to respond to a few

4

comments.

First of all, this comment doesn't really

5

relate to the motion, but Mr. McDonald said, "Well,

6

Matrix and my client are obviously affiliated companies,M

7

and I think that is an attempt to show that there are

8

some underhanded dealings, some back door, back room

9

negotiations.

There are not facts to support that.

Just

10

because you have a director on one board of directors and

11

a director on another board of directors that are

12

independent board of directors, does not mean they are

13

affiliated.

14

so I really object strenuously to that kind of statement.

15

It is clear that the defense to the enforcement

There is just no evidence to support that,

16

of the note is fraudulent inducement based upon the

17

statement, MIt has not been relet.

18

vacant."

19

have never said that is a. material misstatement.

20

McDonald uses his hypothetical, I will too, that there is

21

a continuum of statements.

22

M

23

that.

24

make it material as to the negotiations.

25

The premises are

That is what they are now claiming.

But they
As Mr.

Let's say my client said,

The moon is made out of cheese."

Well, they may believe

They may have taken that as true, but that doesn't

THE COURT:

But weren't they negotiating to
27

relieve themselves of potential futii ire liability
potential liability for future rente that they would not
->

paying?
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|i" 1

1

there w a s a new tenant.
' n*-se negotiations tha* Mr.
•

1
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21

evidence that there w a s
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We
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22
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23

ao^urnentary e v i d e r ^ t

24

p r o b a t i v e , t o t h a t I s s u e t h a n wha*. r i s

25
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.0 ruucn more

conclusionary

1

material and here is the reason why.

There is a case

2

very close to this "Sugar House Finance vs. Anderson,"

3

which we cited in our memorandum.

4

decided on a Motion for Summary Judgment.

5

enforced a Settlement Agreement.

6

and a creditor.

7

out of the Settlement Agreement because he found out the

8

debtor had more assets than the debtor disclosed, and the

9

Court wouldn't let them do that, and the Supreme Court

It is a case that was
The Court

It was between a debtor

In this case the creditor wanted to get

10

wouldn't let them do that.

11

may be made either by affirmative statement or by

12

material omission where there exists a duty to speak.

13

Such a duty will not be found where the parties deal at

14

arm's length and where the underlying facts are

15

reasonably within the knowledge of both parties. Under

16

the circumstances, the plaintiff is obliged to take steps

17

to inform himself and to protect his own interest."

18

It says, "Misrepresentation

There is no allegation that the defendant here

19

has complied with that duty.

It says, "In the present

20

case plaintiff alleges fraud both in the defendant's

21

failure to state that he owned property in question and

22

in his failure to disclose the proposed sale thereof."

23

And the Court found so what?

24

found those things out had he known, and it just wasn't

25

material to resolution of a dispute.

The creditor could have

29
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MR. SWAN:
.: THE COURT:

context is clear

That is correct.
Even in opposition to a Motion for
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1

Motion for Summary Judgment if they have had ample time

2

for discovery.

3

question, "Oh, we sprung this Motion for Summary Judgment

4

on them."

5

We waited more than a month after we responded to their

6

discovery to file a Motion for Summary Judgment.

7

Now this somehow goes back to their

We did not. We responded to their discovery.

If this Court is not going to grant the Motion

8

for Summary Judgment, and allow them to amend their

9

pleadings and add this counterclaim and add the other

10

defenses that they have made, then I think my client

11

should be awarded its attorney's fees and costs for

12

having gone through the exercise of filing a Motion for

13

Summary Judgment, not knowing that they were going to

14

suddenly raise all of these additional allegations after

15

they have gone through their first set of discovery.

16

Mr. McDonald makes a lot out of his Rule 11

17

obligations. Well, he did his discovery.

18

choose to file an amended answer or counterclaim until

19

after the Motion for Summary Judgment was filed, and he

20

had plenty of time to do so.

21

He didn't

So I think my client has been prejudiced by

22

that and that is why we have moved to not allow the

23

amendment and some other things, moved for protective

24

orders to try to focus that we were following things in

25

good order, allowing plenty of time for the defendant to
31
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1
2
3

THE COURT:

Mr. Swan, you do have the last

word, so —
MR. SWAN:

Again, he has raised the issue that

4

it is material because they believed they would not have

5

owed any money.

6

fact, the affidavits clearly show that my client was

7

still losing money after the Settlement Agreement.

8

so they try to make it material by saying that they

9

wouldn't have owed any money but that is just not the

That fact is not before the Court.

In

And

10

case. The uncontroverted facts are, and there is a long

11

calculation in Mr. Lloyd"s affidavit of the rent

12

differential.

13

rate, that they were losing money.

14

filling their duty to mitigate.

15

It was leased at a less square footage
And so they were

And the reason I say muddy up the water is, it

16

seems incongruous to me that a party can say, "We weren't

17

relying on any of our representations and we had advice

18

of counsel."

19

the way, we did rely and.we want to make that the defense

20

and make that an issue."

21

But now when we are asked to pay, "Oh, by

Now I think also in executory courts, the law

22

is quite clear that if this Court were to find that this

23

executory court was induced by fraud and it is voidable,

24

then that opens up the defendant to potential liability

25

under the lease because it is executory in nature by its
33

very terms if it is not completed until paid in full. So
that whole Pandora's box would be opened up.

I am not

suggesting the Court should not open that up, but the
Settlement Agreement was very clearly designed to try to
liquidate an amount, and it really didn't make a
difference based upon its own terms about whether the
premises were relet or not.
THE COURT: All right.

Thank you, counsel.

(At this point the Judge gave her ruling which
has already previously been transcribed.)
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1

FRIDAY, JANUARY 10, 1992

2

JUDGE'S RULING

3

THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you, counsel.

I

4

appreciate your arguments and the thoroughness in which you

5

presented this this afternoon.

6

as I told you before, I have read the memoranda and

1

voluminous pleadings that have been submitted on this case.
This is the Plaintiff!s Motion for Summary

8
9

I have considered this and,

Judgment to enforce a settlement agreement that was entered

10

into by the parties at the time that the defendant terminate4

11

the lease unilaterally.

12

claim considerable thought.

13

any misrepresentations were made, that under these facts the

14

defendant has not shown by clear and convincing evidence

15

that the misrepresentations were material for the reasons

16

argued by the plaintiff's counsel, but here and in its

17

pleadings.

18

Frankly, I have given the fraud
I am frankly persuaded that if

This is a rather unusual kind of a ruling, I think,]

19 I in these kinds of actions but there is a burden on the
20

defendant to show by clear and convincing evidence that

21

fraudulent misrepresentations were made or omissions in the

22

face of the duty to speak.

23

were misrepresentations, but there is some evidence to the

24

contrary.

25

entitled to summary judgment alone.

I am not convinced that there

And so on that point, plaintiffs would not be
But it seems to me

1

that that, under all of the facts, including the contractual

2

obligations which the defendants submit they did owe at

3

that time, both having already accrued and what they were

4

exposed to, and in light of the damages amounts that the

5

plaintiffs did suffer as a result of the termination of

6

the lease, and cost associated with re-letting, and all of

7

that, when you look at all of the numbers that are involved,

8

I just don't see this as material.

9

defendants have met their burden of showing by clear and

I don't think that the

10

convincing evidence that there was fraud in the inducement

11

in this action.

12

to accord that view and would rather on the issue of

13

liability grant summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

14

For that reason then, I am not inclined

Now, there are contested issues as to the amount

15

of interest owing, whether it is ten percent or ten percent

16

per annum; and we haven't addressed that tod ay.

17

there is any dispute about attorney!s fees, we will need to

18

deal with that as well.

19

address the issue of damages at this time, procedurally,

20

just how you would like the Court to resolve that.

21

MR. SWAN:

Also, if

So, counsel, I would like you to

Well, to be frank, Your Honor, I have
of

construction of

22

not done any legal analysis

23

rates when it is not -- when the phrase "per annum" is not

24

set forth in the note.

25

my practice, and I do this quite a bit, that that is a

interest

It would be my suspicion because of

2

1

phrase or an understanding of the note that the Court can

2 I infer, otherwise it is not sensical.

Calculate interest on

3

some kind of period.

4

that the defendants were calculating their own payments

And I think we can show by the way

5 I and by their own affidavit, they show how much they were
6

paying.

They were calculating it on a per annum basis.

1

For instance, they owed their first payment so many months

8

after the execution of the note.

9

amount due, plus the accrued interest portion and that

They paid the principal

10

calculation is quite simple.

H

is what they were using.

12

clear showing by the conduct of the parties that there was

13

a meeting of the minds that that meant a yearly basis.

14

It was ten percent per annum

And so, I think that there is a

if the Court would like me to brief how the Court

'5

is supposed to construe that, I can do the calculation right

16

here and show you that that is how they construed it them-

17 J selves based upon their own affidavit.
18

THE COURT:

I don't know that we are going to get

19

this issue resolved today and I don't know on what other

m

points the defendants might disagree with the amount of

21

damages.

22

Mr. Mc Donald has got a better idea, is to submit your

23

judgment on the issue of liability and set forth the amount

24

of damages.

25

can have a hearing on that.

I think the better way to handle this, unless

And if Mr. Mc Donald objects to that, then we
Unless, Mr. Mc Donald, do you

1 have a nother suggestion?
2

MR. MC DONALD:

The problem that I have, Your• Honor

3 and it is inherent in th e ruling that has been made by the
that the case has been presented

4

Court and that is this:

5

as a case for summary ju dgment on a note.

6

decided on the basis of something that I didn't regard as

7

being an issue and that was their calculations of what would 1

8

be due» without the note.

9

to be add ressed.

That isn't an issue that was raised

There were substantial factual disputes

10

with the manner in which they claimed this.

11

there is only 3,000 in dispute --

12

It has been

THE COURT:

No, no.

VJhen you say

I am not talking about that.

13

I am not talking about the amount of the note itself.

14

issues that I really see that remain unresolved as to

15

damages, are the interest figure, attorney's fees and costs

16

I don't see, you know, the basic underlying amount of the

17

promissory note as remaining at issue.

18

MR. MC DONALD:

Well, in light of the Court's

19

decisions, it is not.

20

guess maybe --

21

non-materiality, it is based upon a finding that their

22

calculation of what would be due without the note are

23

correct.

24
25

The

The problem I had with it is, and I

now that I hear the Court's basis for

THE COURT:

That I used as an overall context.

However, my ruling, my finding, was assuming there were

1

misrepresentations that were made, they are not material to

2

the promissory note and the negotiations of the promissory

j

note.

4

has by law the burden of proof, rather heavy burden of

5

proof

5

were

7

had been m e t .

g
9

And I find that because I felt that the defendants

to show by clear and c o n v i n c i n g e v i d e n c e
in fact m a t e r i a l , and

Now the only
be resolved

I didn't

issues that

that

see that that

burden

I d o s e e that r e m a i n

are w h e t h e r the i n t e r e s t w a s p e r annum

IQ

to that, I didn't

focus on that as we p r e p a r e d

II

But there is obviously

12

note and t h e r e f o r e , you k n o w , this may c o m e d o w n

13

of c o n s t r u c t i o n , you know, as to w h o d r a f t e d

contention

they

and

here

about w h o d r a f t e d

to
as

today.
this

to a r u l i n g

the n o t e

and

14 I whether it was ten percent or -15

MR. MC DONALD:

|g

THE COURT:

It is parol evidence.

Maybe it is parol evidence, but I

17

think that that issue is an issue that remains in my mind

18

and then the issue of attorney's fees and costs.

19

the only issues that I see that remain.

20

MR. MC DONALD:

Those are

Well, I can't conceive of how we

21

can resolve those issues on summary judgment.

So maybe we

22

can attempt.

23

light of the Court's ruling so we don't have to come back,

24

but I can't conceive of how we can in this circumstance

25

start resolving factual disputes.

I will certainly attempt to resolve this in

1 I

THE COURT:

Well, I am just looking for a procedural

2 I mechanism in which to resolve it.

That is all.

And if it

3 I is something that is reserved for trial because it can't
4

be resolved in a summary fashion, then so be it because that

5

is the way it will come out.

5

However, I would like to address at least a couple

7

of the other motions.

I think with regard to the issue of

g

damages, I am granting summary judgment on the issue of

9

liability as requested in plaintifffs motion.

I am not

1Q

resolving today, I am not ruling on the issue, deciding one

11

way or the other on the issue of damages.

12

remains alive.

13

issue of damages, attorney's fees and costs, then you may do

14

so, or if you are not able to resolve that by discussions

15

between the two of you, otherwise it is considered preserved

15

for trial if no motion is filed.

17

And that issue

If you want to make a specific motion on the

And with regard to the other pending motions, as

18

to the Motion to Amend, implicit in my ruling is that I

19

would deny the Motion to Amend to allege a counterclaim

20

setting forth fraud as a cause of action.

21
22
23

MR. MC DONALD:

You are denying the Motion to

Amend?
THE COURT:

That is correct, and in so doing I

24

don't find that it was unreasonably -- or rather, that it

25

was untimely.

I think that it was early enough in the

1

lawsuit, but rather I looked to the substantive issue of

2

fraud and it doesn't make any sense to me that having found

3

that -- I don't see that when the issue has been framed as

4

to the claims of fraud, that there has been clear and

5

convincing evidence to show, that it would make sense then

6

to turn around and say, "Okay, now, amend your Answer and

1

include the counterclaim on this very issue that I just said

8

wasn't clear and convincing at this point."

9

I am denying the Motion to Amend,

10

MR. MC DONALD:

That is why

The problem I have, if the Motion

11

to Amend is not granted, then fraud isn't before the Court

12

on summary judgment.

13
14

MR. SWAN;

It is in the way of the affirmative

defense on how to defend a motion.

15

THE COURT:

Well, you defend it on that basis and

16

I considered it in that context.

17

i reserved on that.

I indicated I had read all of the

18

pleadings about it.

Motion to Amend is denied.

19
20

Now, are there any other motions that we need to
deal with today?

21
22
23

It was a pending motion

MR. MC DONALD:

I think the others would be moot

now.
MR. SWAN:

I believe so, Your Honor.

The Motion

24

to Strike the Affidavit of John Parsons, that was submitted

25

in the support of their opposition memorandum.

Our motion

1

for Protective Order is probably moot since there is no

2

need for discovery.

Just so the Court knows, we have

3 I answered that discovery belatedly to try to get this matter
4

cleaned up and maybe settle this case.

5

by our own response to their discovery except for maybe thei|r

* I response for attorney's fees.
7

So it was made moot

I don't know.

Motion to compel, I think that is made moot.

They]

8 I had a Motion to Strike our supplemental affidavits and I
* ' think the Court has allowed those appendix implicit in its
10

ruling and been willing to consider those.

H

are all moot

12
13
1* I
15
16

THE COURT:

Very well.

I think those

Is there anything else

then, counsel?
MR. M,C DONALD:

Will you prepare an Order?

(Talking to Mr. Swan.)
THE COURT:

Yes.

Mr. Swan, I want you to prepare

17

a judgment and Order in accordance with the ruling this

18

afternoon, and do you need a scheduling in case?

19

MR. SWAN:

20

THE COURT:

For a trial?
No, I wouldn't set it for trial.

21

Just in terms of a discovery cut-off, if you are not

22

completed and cut-off for any other motions.

23

MR. SWAN:

Well, it would be my hope that based

24

upon this Court's ruling of liability, that Mr. McDonald

25

and I can get together and resolve this issue on damages.

8

I

If his client still wants to fight, then m a y b e we will do

2

those.

THE C O U R T :

3

4
5

I don't know what the position is going to be.
Why don't you do t h i s - -

O h , go ahead,

M r . Mc Donald.
I

MR. M C DONALD:

Why don't we address that?
have had an opportunity to think

g

Obviously, neither of us

1

in the new context of the case.

g

in fact we are unable to agree and you think it is a

9

summary judgment issue, we should file a supplemental or

jQ

a different motion so

II

know we were going to have to address today.

12

m e a n t i m e , we will attempt to resolve it in light of the

13

Court's ruling reserving all appeal rights and so forth

14 I

so we can bring it to a conclusion.

jc

THE C O U R T :

we can now

I would suggest that if

address what we didn't
In the

W e l l , do you see the need to do any

lg

additional discovery or you are just not prepared

17

analyze that?

18

MR. M C DONALD:

to

W e l l , I don't think we w i l l know

j9

that until we can determine whether we can resolve the

20

damage issue.

21

case is over unless there is an appeal filed.

22

If the damage issue can be resolved, the

THE C O U R T :

Why don't you do t h i s .

If you see

23

the need for -- if you are not able to resolve it s a t i s -

24

factoriy between yourselves, then why don't you on or b e f o r ^

25

December 31st to file a proposed scheduling

--

1

MR. MC DONALD:

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. MC DONALD:

4

THE COURT:

You mean January?

What did I say?
December.

I am looking at January and said

5

December.

File by January 31st a proposed schedule and

6

all I want you to include in that is discovery cut-off and

7

about two weeks after that a motion -- a cut-off for any

8

other dispositive motions you might have.

9

week after that, if no dispositive motions are filed, then

And about a

10

a date by which one of you would file a Certification of

11

Readiness for Trial.

12

a scheduling conference and schedule a final pretrial and

13

trial.

14

In other words, if you can't resolve it otherwise.

And at that point, then we will have

But don't do that unless you find it necessary.

15

MR. SWAN:

One of my concerns, Your Honor, is I

16

am going to -- cause I don't take as copious of notes as

17

i should when you rule, I am probably going to require a

18

transcript of the ruling portion of this hearing, so I can

19

make sure I have got everything in the Order.

20

know how long it will take to get something in order to

21

present something to Mr. Mc Donald.

22

THE REPORTER:

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. SWAN:

25

I don't

I can do it right away.

Dorothy says she can do it right away
Then we should be able to meet that

deadline.

10

1

THE COURT:

If you can, fine.

I am not so concerned

2

about January 31st as I am if you -- if you are not able to

3

resolve it, then let's get a scheduling in place and then we

4

can get this matter resolved.

5

MR. MC DONALD:

In light of the unknown, why don't

6

we just have it at such a time as we find we are unable to

7

negotiate, if we can.

8

conference and will go from there.

9

MR. SWAN:

We will just file for a scheduling

My anticipation if we can't agree on

10

this interest rate issue, then I will file a Motion for

11

Summary Judgment on that issue.

12

think I know what the law is.

13

THE COURT:

I am pretty confident I

All right.

The final ruling will be

14

this, in order to give you a little more time, if you are

15

not able to resolve this then by February 14th, and that is

16

more than a month down the road, if you are not able to

17

resolve it by then, then submit a proposed schedule if you

18

can agree on one. Okay?

19
20

MR. MC DONALD:
conference?

21

THE COURT:

22

one.

23

that.

24

done.

25

Otherwise, move for a scheduling

Well, no, just submit your respective

I don't think we need to have another hearing about
I am just looking for the easiest way to get that

MR. MC DONALD:
THE COURT:

All right, thank you, Your Honor.

Thank you.
•

•

• •

•
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MONDAY, NOVEMBER 3 0 ,

2

J U D G E ' S

THE COURT:

1992:

B E N C H

P.M.

SESSION

R U L I N G

Thank you, counsel.

I reviewed the motions and all the memoranda that
6

have been submitted and the affidavits, and I am prepared to

7

rule at this time on the motions.

8

the Court:

9

partial motion or a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and the

10

There are two motions before

The Plaintiff's Motion for what is essentially a

Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

11

The specific issue first to be resolved is the

12

construction of the interest rate in the promissory note.

13

parties to a contract such as this are not entitled to a better

14

contract than the one that they entered into.

15

that, it is incumbent upon the Court to make a first

Now,

And having said

16; determination that in a contract dispute whether the underlying
17

contract, in this case the promissory note, is clear and

18

unambiguous.

19

And in this particular case, the language that is

20

relevant to the interest rate makes no mention of a per annum

21

interest rate.

22

rate either.

It doesn't make mention of a flat rate interest
I don't think there is any ambiguity about that

23; contract in and of itself, just that it's missing a term.
i

24

It seems to me that in looking at that, and also

25| looking at the other language, "interest to accrue," or the
-\ . -» i^v M *

4

A

II accruing language only makes sense if this contract was to
21 provide for per annum interest rate.

So then you have one part

3

of the contract, the note, making reference to "accruing."

4

does only make sense if there is a per annum rate, I believe,

5

as a matter of law, and yet there is no mention of whether the

6j rate is to be a flat rate or an accruing rate.

It

If it were a

7| flat rate, then you might even have an ambiguous note, but
i

8; that's not really the issue before the Court.
9

The plaintiff relies on the statute which sets forth

10

what is to happen when parties, public or private, to deeds and

I

11
12
13

other documents mentioned in that have not mentioned whether a
rate -- how a rate is to be calculated, at least when there is

no rate that's mentioned.
14| fashion the statute.

15

And I paraphrase in very rough

As I look at the statute, in looking at this

16i promissory note, it appears to me that the plaintiff's position
17

is well taken.

18

does provide the Court the justification for inserting a term

19

in a contract.

That the statute does control in this case,

The parties are not entitled to a better

201 contract than the one that they entered into, and generally
21

courts do not imply terms or read terms or add terms to a

22

contract.

But in this case I think the legislature has done

23j just that.
24j

And therefore, for those reasons and the other

25j reasons set forth by Mr. Swan on behalf of the plaintiff, I am
^

,\

r\ r*f A —

4

1j going to grant partial summary judgment in favor of the
2 1 plaintiff and deny that aspect of summary judgment on behalf of
3
4

the defendant.
Then as to the question of late fees and attorney's

5j fees, the contract provided for the payment of late fees when
6 1 payments were, in fact, late.

And it appears to me as I look

7: at that, that the contract is clear and unambiguous, that late
8

fees were to apply.

And finally with regard to attorney's

9j fees, clearly attorney's fees are appropriate for enforcing the
10

rights under that promissory note.

In this case the plaintiff

11

has prevailed on the issues that it has advanced.

And

12j consistent with that provision, the Court also grants summary
13j judgment on the issue of attorney's fees.
14|

And there has not been -- well, in any event, for

15| those reasons I am going to grant summary judgment as prayed
16j for by the plaintiff and deny it as to the defendant.
17

Is there anything I have overlooked?

18

Counsel.

19

MR. McDONALD:

In preparing the order I take it that

20

we can insert that, so there is no question as to the basis of

21

the Court's decision, that this decision was made out of the

22; consideration of the extrinsic evidence.
i

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. SWAN:

25

summary judgment.

That is correct.
Your Honor, you have called it a partial

I believe this resolves all the issues.

~~~"

~
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lj It's only partial because there was a prior partial, but it's a
2; final judgment as far as all the issues.
3

THE COURT:

That's my understanding, Mr. Swan.

4

want you to prepare an order for this Motion for Summary

5

Judgment.

I

I want you to prepare a judgment consistent with all

6j these rulings.
7j

Now, you do not have to prepare findings of fact.

8; That's not required by law.

Sometimes you get into more

arguments over what was found and what wasn't.

I do want to

10

say that when I make a ruling from the bench, I try to hit on

11

the highlights of the bases for the Court's decision.

12

mean those remarks to be all-inclusive.

13

the practice of at least trying to remember to say, "and for

14

other reasons set forth," so that those reasons that are

15i

I don't

And I have now adopted

consistent with the Court's ruling can also be considered.

i

16»

I did find those arguments of the plaintiff persuasive under

17

the facts of the case and in looking at that note and that

18

statute.

19

MR. SWAN:

20

THE COURT:

21

(This concludes the Judge's Bench Ruling.)

Thank you, your Honor.
Thank you, counsel.

•

22

*

*

23*
»

24!

25!

0007 J"

But

C E R T I F I C A T E
3

STATE OF UTAH

)

4

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

5

I, SUZANNE WARNICK, CSR, RPR-CM, do certify that I am

6

a Certified Shorthand Reporter, Registered Professional

7

Reporter with the Certificate of Merit, and a Notary Public in

8

and for the State of Utah.

9

That at the time and place of the proceedings in the

10

foregoing matter, I appeared as the court reporter in the Third

11

Judicial District Court for the Honorable Judge Anne M. Stirba

12

and thereat reported in stenotype all of the proceedings had

13

therein,

14

That thereafter, my said shorthand notes of the

15; Judge's Bench Ruling were transcribed by computer into the
16| foregoing pages; and that this constitutes a full, true and
17
18
19

correct transcript of the same.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL in Salt Lake City, Utah on
this, the 23rd day of January, 1993.

20

Q-^Suzannf

21
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Warnick, CSR, RPR-CM

22
23
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24
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My commission expires
1 April 1995
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